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ESSAYS ON LABOR AND PRODUCT MARKETS
Hakki Lee, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2016
This dissertation is a collection of three essays on labor economics and industrial organiza-
tion. In the first essay, I study how and to what extent labor market frictions, which are
defined as the inability to costlessly find jobs or move between jobs, affect workers’ schooling
decisions. In order to study this link, I use an on-the-job search model. Consistent with the
data, the model economy predicts that a higher job-to-job transition rate increases the op-
portunity cost of a college education, reducing the incentives for schooling. Instead, a higher
job separation rate decreases the opportunity cost, leading to more schooling. In addition,
a higher job finding rate increases employment duration, which can help college educated
workers enjoy higher skill prices for a longer time and lead to more investment in schooling.
In the second essay, I explore whether the number and types of people who attend college
affect the college wage premium, which is defined as the wage of college graduates relative
to high school graduates. I estimate the return to schooling by exploiting all of the variation
or only the exogenous variation in educational attainment as the instrumental variable. The
result reveals that composition effects account for nearly one half of the observed return
to schooling. In addition, I find strong evidence that sudden short-run changes in educa-
tional attainment lowered education wage premiums for the affected cohorts, but only weak
evidence that long-run trend changes in educational attainment lowered education wage
premiums.
The third essay analyzes a monopolistic supplier’s optimal decision of input prices when
two downstream sellers simultaneously choose their advertisement efforts and their output
levels. The independent advertisement decision by each seller causes the free-rider problem
iv
by its rivals. The supplier uses price-discrimination to alleviate the free-riding problem
associated with the advertisement decision. Therefore, allowing price-discrimination may
increase aggregate output– and social surplus– the reverse of the welfare implications in the
previous literature.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is a collection of three essays on labor economics and industrial organi-
zation. The first two essays focus on individuals’ schooling choices and their effect on the
college wage premium. In the final essay, I direct my attention to another important issue in
the product market. I focus on the merits of price discrimination in input markets, a topic
that has long been debated intensively. In particular, I study the effects of third-degree price
discrimination in input markets when downstream firms can enhance demand by advertising.
The first essay, titled “Schooling Investment in Frictional Labor Markets,”1 is presented
in Chapter 2. In this paper, I address the question of how and to what extent labor market
frictions, which are defined as the inability to costlessly find jobs or move between jobs,
affect individuals’ schooling decisions. First, I present some empirical evidence that there is
a correlation between labor market frictions and college attainment across countries. The
literature has focused on various aspects of human capital investment, but not on the re-
lationship between labor market frictions and college attainment, which has yet to receive
much attention. In order to investigate the channels of the relationship between labor mar-
ket frictions and individuals’ schooling decisions, I develop an on-the-job search model with
workers’ schooling choice prior to labor market entry, in which firms are heterogeneous in
their productivities and workers are heterogeneous with respect to the amenity value of
schooling. Before labor market entry, workers decide whether to go to college by taking into
account schooling costs and the difference between the value of unemployment for high school
graduates and college graduates. High school graduates experience multiple job turnovers
toward better paying jobs, while their counterparts spend years in college. If they move up
the wage ladder through job turnover during their first four years in the labor market, the
1This research is a joint work with Seung-Gyu Sim.
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opportunity cost of college education during this period may not be negligible. Therefore,
considering the opportunity cost of a college education is an important channel.
The main finding of this paper is that higher job finding rates or separation rates can
increase schooling, while an increase in the job-to-job transition rate discourages schooling.
This finding is consistent with the empirical evidence. The key intuition for this result
is that when the job finding rate decreases, the unemployment duration increases, which
means that the period in which a worker exploits his human capital shortens. Therefore, the
shorter duration leads to a lower college attainment rate. If the job separation rate increases,
then the unemployment duration gets longer and the opportunity cost of a college education
decreases, both of which have opposite effects on schooling. First, a worker faces less time in
which he can exploit his human capital on the job, so his college attainment may decrease.
Second, a worker with a high school degree faces a higher chance of being separated from his
job, which lowers the opportunity cost of choosing a college education. This leads workers
to get more education before entering the labor market. As a result, when the latter effect
dominates the former one, college attainment increases. Finally, a lower job-to-job transition
rate implies that a worker with only a high school degree cannot easily move to jobs that pay
better while his counterpart is in college. Hence, the opportunity cost of getting a college
education is lower, which induces an increase in the college attainment rate.
Under the presence of labor market frictions, I address the interesting question of whether
the current level of education investment is socially efficient. To answer this question, I
assume that there is a benevolent social planner who cares only about the welfare of workers
and who decides how workers will choose schooling and how they are matched with jobs,
taking labor market frictions as given. Surprisingly, I find that there is an over-investment
in schooling. The intuition behind this result is that firms tend to suppress unskilled wage
offers, and the wage differentials exceed productivity differentials. As a result, returns to
higher education get bigger in the market equilibrium.
In Chapter 3, titled “Policy-Induced Variation in College Labor Supply and the Skill
Premium,”2 I test for the importance of composition effects in affecting levels and changes
of education wage premiums in the context of Korea. Korea offers an interesting case because
2This research is a joint work with Jaehan Cho and Todd Shoellman
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it has experienced a rise in educational attainment and education wage premiums, like most
other advanced economies. However, the rise in education in Korea was much larger and
more rapid than that in most other advanced economies. Further, some of the increase was
policy-induced.
In this paper, I adopt two empirical strategies previously used in the literature to quantify
ability and composition effects in the United States in a consistent and unified way. My
analysis yields two main results. The first concerns the importance of composition effects
in accounting for the cross-sectional return to schooling. In line with Kaymak (2009), I
find that composition effects account for nearly one half of the observed return to schooling,
indicating that the true private return to schooling is slightly more than half of the observed
Mincer return. The second result concerns the importance of composition effects in the time
series. Consistent with Juhn et al. (2005), I find evidence that increasing college attainment
lowers the college wage premium for a cohort, suggesting that higher college attainment is
obtained by lowering the relative ability of college graduates.
Chapter 4 presents the third essay, titled “Input Price Discrimination, Informative Ad-
vertisement Efforts, and Welfare.”3 The paper investigates optimal linear wholesale pricing
by a monopolistic manufacturer that serves two downstream firms. The downstream firms
differ in production costs, produce a homogeneous product, and compete in quantities. The
manufacturer may be constrained by a non-discrimination clause, and I analyze the effects
of such a legal rule. The novelty of the paper is in allowing downstream firms to exert costly
effort in order to boost market demand (interpreted as advertising expenditures). Down-
stream firms’ effort choices are substitutes, and, thus, a free-riding problem arises. Moreover,
because effort choices are non-contractible, the wholesale prices are the only available instru-
ment to incentivize downstream firms.
A well-known result in the literature on price discrimination in intermediate goods mar-
kets, as in Katz (1987), DeGraba (1990), and Yoshida (2000), is that the less efficient firm
receives a discount. This immediately implies that permitting price discrimination reduces
allocative efficiency–i.e., output is shifted to the less efficient firm–and, for linear demand,
also reduces total welfare. If downstream firms can invest in demand-enhancing efforts, these
3This research is a joint work with Seung-Gyu Sim.
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findings may be reversed, as this paper shows: For certain parameter ranges, the more ef-
ficient firm receives a discount, and permitting price discrimination increases total welfare.
The main insight is that under price discrimination, the supplier can alleviate the free-riding
problem with regard to advertising efforts by offering the more efficient downstream firms a
discount, which also furthers allocative efficiency. In particular, the supplier has an incentive
to discriminate between downstream firms even if these are identical. Numerical simulations
show that this reduction in the free-riding problem can be strong enough to make a ban on
price discrimination harmful to welfare.
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2.0 SCHOOLING INVESTMENT IN FRICTIONAL LABOR MARKETS1
2.1 INTRODUCTION
It is not surprising that labor market frictions, which are defined as the inability to cost-
lessly find jobs or move between jobs, affect workers’ incentives to acquire skills and accu-
mulate human capital. Indeed, numerous papers study human capital accumulation through
learning-by-doing or continuous investment by either employers or employees in a frictional
labor market.2 However, there are not many papers regarding how labor market frictions
affect workers’ schooling decisions prior to their labor market entry. It is well known that
schooling is the most efficient way of accumulating human capital. A simple illustration that
shows there is a relationship between college attainment rates and the labor market frictions
is presented in Figure 1, using partial regressions.3 It depicts that college attainment rate is
correlated positively with the job finding and separation rates (but weaker correlation), and
negatively correlated with job turnover rate. The regression analysis also reports that job
finding, separation, and turnover rates have (95 percent confidence level) significant partial
effects by themselves. Motivated by Figure 1, this paper separately identifies the channels
through which labor market friction affects returns to higher education and its opportunity
cost, particularly focusing on the joint influence of these channels. In addition, it analyzes
1This research is a joint work with Seung-Gyu Sim.
2See Acemoglu (1997) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) for on-the-job training and Burdett et al. (2011)
and Bagger et al. (2014) for learning-by-doing on the job.
3We obtain the partial regression estimates using the following procedure. For each plot, first, we regress
college attainment rate on the isolated labor market friction that is of interest. Next, the fitted college
attainment rate is regressed on the fitted labor market friction. This analysis is performed using a cross-
sectional data that consist of 27 OECD countries in total, which are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
5
the efficiency of the decentralized market equilibrium.
Figure 1: Search Friction and College Attainment Rate
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Note: We present three panels that show partial correlations between college attainment rates (share) and
job finding rate (UE), employment-to-employment transition rate (EE) and separation rate (separation),
respectively. The control variables (X) change by the labor market friction rate of interest. For instance,
in the upper left panel, the y-axis shows the expected college attainment rate conditional on employment-
to-employment transition rate, separation rate and education spending. The x-axis shows the expected
job finding rate conditional on employment-to-employment rate, separation rate and education spending.
The college attainment rates are borrowed from Barro and Lee (2013) and its companion webpage http:
//www.barrolee.com/. The sample size is limited to the available data for the labor market frictions.
The information for the worker flows are mostly borrowed from Hobijn and S¸ahin (2009) and it is available
for 27 countries. Korean data are calculated from the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study.
In reality, workers enter the labor market as unemployed. Once they become employed,
they start working and share the match surplus with their employers according to a certain
wage norm. Then, they repeatedly experience unemployment and employment until they
retire. Given mortality of human beings, Manuelli and Seshadri (2009), Co´rdoba and Ripoll
(2013), and Restuccia and Vandenbroucke (2014) argue that expected lifespan is one of the
6
most important factors when accounting cross country schooling differences. Apart from
life expectancy, an individual worker’s decisions pertaining to education and schooling are
related to employment spells, skill prices, and the presence of search frictions. Consequently,
higher skill prices for longer utilization spells encourage investment in schooling. Another
significant channel through which labor market friction affects workers’ schooling decision
prior to their labor market entry is the opportunity cost of schooling. Topel and Wald (1992)
find that a typical worker holds seven jobs during the first 10 years of employment. Sim
(2014) reports the average job duration of American white male high school graduates to
be slightly over two years. Those stylized facts imply that high school graduates experience
multiple job turnovers (toward better paying jobs), while their counterparts in college have
opportunity costs during school that may not be negligible.
To capture those channels, this paper incorporates workers’ schooling decisions into the
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) framework, which is a canonical framework in the literature of
on-the-job search.4 Firms are heterogenous in their productivities. Workers are heterogenous
with respect to the amenity value of (or disutility from) schooling.5 Workers enter the labor
market either after high school or college graduation; firms post skill-dependent wages. Firms
know the labor force available for the job evolves with the employee’s wage. Firms that can
offer higher wages can keep the worker for a longer time at the steady-state. Also, they
can hold a larger work force because they will attract more workers to the company. Given
the heterogeneity in the education of workers, firms compete with each other to attract
high-skilled workers because college educated workers can contribute to the productivity
of the firm more than high school graduates. However, wage offer distributions, rarely
observed in general, are expected to be first order stochastically dominated by the wage
earning distributions due to on-the-job search in frictional labor markets.6 By developing a
4Shimer (2006) points out that the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution, adopted in usual wage-bargaining
models, is inapplicable to a search and matching model with on-the-job search because the set of feasible
payoffs is typically nonconvex so that an increase in the wage raises the duration of an employment relation-
ship.
5The assumption of heterogenous schooling values is common in labor and macro literature, for example
Heckman et al. (1998a), Bils and Klenow (2000), and Restuccia and Vandenbroucke (2013a).
6Christensen et al. (2005), using data from the Danish Integrated Database for Labour Market Research,
estimate a job search model with on-the-job search and separately identifies the wage offer distribution from
the wage earning distribution.
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structural model, we elicit the opportunity cost based on the wage offer distribution.
The main finding of this paper is that labor market frictions have an important role in
schooling decisions through two channels: employment duration and the opportunity cost
of schooling. It shows that the employment duration for college graduates rises with the
job finding rate and declines with the job separation rate as well as the retirement rate.
Therefore, higher employment duration allows college graduates to enjoy higher skill prices
for a longer time. The opportunity cost of higher education increases in the employment-
to-employment transition rate and decreases in the job separation rate. Consistent with the
empirical findings, the calibrated model based on the U.S. labor market data predicts that an
increase in job finding or separation rate encourages schooling but an increase in employment-
to-employment transition rate discourages schooling. The main intuition behind these results
is the following: When the job finding rate decreases, the unemployment duration increases,
which means that the period a worker exploits the human capital shortens. Therefore, the
shorter duration leads to a lower college attainment rate. If job separation rate increases,
then longer unemployment duration and lower opportunity cost of choosing college education
is obtained, both of which have opposite effects on schooling. First, a worker faces lesser time
that he can exploit his human capital on the job, so the college attainment may decrease.
Second, a worker with a high school degree faces higher chance to be separated from the job.
Therefore, there is a lower probability to move up on the wage ladder. This leads workers
to want to pursue more education before entering the labor market. As a result, the latter
effect dominates the former one, so a higher college attainment rate is obtained. Last, when
the employment-to-employment transition rate is lower, it implies that a worker with only
a high school degree cannot easily move up on the wage ladder while his counterpart is in
college. Hence, the opportunity cost of getting a college education is lower, which induces
an increase in college attainment rate.
For efficiency analysis, we develop the constrained social planner problem, who takes
labor market friction as given and makes schooling decisions on behalf of individual workers in
order to maximize the present value of the expected net output flow throughout their career,
as in Sim (2015). Our numerical experiments comparing the market equilibrium outcome
with the planner’s outcome show that firms suppress unskilled wage offers further than
8
skilled wage offers overall. This makes the (discounted) skilled-unskilled wage differentials
exceed (discounted) productivity differentials and escalates returns to higher education in the
market equilibrium. Recently, Flinn and Mullins (2015) extend the wage-bargaining model
to allow for endogenous schooling choice. In their model, the weak bargaining position of
workers, which is assumed to be same across different skill levels, reduces wage differentials
transmitted from productivity differentials. As a result, there is an under-investment in
schooling. In these models, there is also the standard holdup problem that emerges because
wage contracts are not determined at the time the schooling decision is made. Had we
assumed wage determination by Nash bargaining, the holdup problem might be exacerbated
particularly when the workers’ bargaining power is low. This would lead to a larger mismatch
between aggregate returns to schooling and workers’ private returns. However, our model
abstracts from a match function and Nash bargaining, so holdup is relatively not an issue.
In contrast, we, by endogenizing the wage offer distributions, demonstrate that the unskilled
wage offers, being further suppressed than the skilled offers, result in over-investment in
schooling.7
Flinn and Mullins (2015), concerning under-investment in schooling, propose that school-
ing subsidies improve aggregate welfare. Although our paper indicates over-investment in
schooling, it suggests that enhancing the quality of higher education improves social welfare.
It shows that the over-investment problem (relative to the constrained planner’s outcome)
can be resolved by encouraging college attainment because the college enrollment decision
by individual workers in the decentralized market equilibrium is less elastic to the changes
in education cost and quality than the enrollment decision by the constrained social plan-
ner in the centralized efficiency benchmark. For example, if the college graduates’ average
productivity improves, the planner accounts for the full improvement in determining the
college enrollment rate, whereas those individual workers in the market equilibrium consider
the improvement in their expected wage offers, which partially reflects the productivity im-
provement. This counterfactual experiment suggests that the U.S. government can resolve
the over-investment problem by encouraging the college attainment rate through lowering
7Charlot and Decreuse (2005) also point out that over-education may take place in a frictional labor
market because of matching externality and self-selection.
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education cost and improving education quality.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 provides empirical results that
shows the relationship between college attainment and labor market frictions; Section 2.3
develops the theoretical model and characterizes the steady state equilibrium; Section 2.4
presents the numerical analysis; Section 2.5 further discusses implications of our study; and
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 EMPIRICAL MOTIVATION
In this section, we provide empirical results that highlight the relationship between schooling
and labor market frictions. We use the following specification in this empirical analysis:
Schoolingj = α0 + α1fj + α2EEj + α3sj + α4spendingj + εj, (2.1)
where fj is job finding rate, EEj is employment-to-employment transition rate, sj is separa-
tion rate and spendingj is education spending for each country j. We use college attainment
rate as a measure of schooling. The college attainment rates are borrowed from Barro and
Lee (2013). The data for worker flows, such as job finding rate, employment-to-employment
transition rate, and separation rate, are used as measures of labor market frictions. Most
of the information about worker flows for all countries except Korea is from Hobijn and
S¸ahin (2009). Korean data are calculated from the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study
(KLIPS).8 We also control for education spending.9
Table 1 shows the estimation results of equation (2.1). The coefficients for job finding rate
and separation rate are positive and significant in all specifications. This relationship can be
explained by the following: As job finding rate increases, it shortens unemployment spells.
This gives more incentives to workers to invest in college education so that they can benefit
from higher returns to schooling for a longer period of time. The positive correlation between
college attainment rate and separation rate can be explained by the opportunity cost. As
8See Appendix A.1 for more-detailed information about the sample and the procedure of computation.
9The data source is OECD (2015), Education spending (indicator). For more detailed information, see
https://data.oecd.org/eduresource/education-spending.htm.
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Table 1: Cross-country regressions explaining schooling with
search frictions
Dependent Variable: College Attainment Rate.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Job finding rate 0.072∗∗ 0.086∗∗ 0.063∗ 0.075∗∗
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Job-to-job transition rate − −1.434 −13.900∗∗∗ −14.808∗∗∗
(1.260) (1.843) (2.590)
Separation rate − − 14.310∗∗∗ 16.141∗∗∗
(2.683) (3.180)
Education spending − − − 0.001
(0.180)
No. of countries 27 25 25 23
R2 0.10 0.17 0.42 0.52
note: The college attainment rates are borrowed from Barro and Lee
(2013) and its companion webpage http://www.barrolee.com/. The
information about the worker flows is mostly borrowed from Hobijn
and S¸ahin (2009). Korean data are calculated from the Korean Labor
and Income Panel Study (KLIPS). Estimation is by robust standard
errors. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. (∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.)
separation rate increases, the opportunity cost of getting a college education becomes smaller
as the value of forgone earnings had workers chosen going to labor market instead of going
to college decreases. Finally, the results show that employment-to-employment transition
rate is negatively correlated with college attainment rate. The intuition behind this result is
related to the increasing opportunity cost. As high school graduates move up on the wage
ladder faster, the value of forgone earnings increases, which hampers the incentives to invest
in college education. These results imply that the labor market frictions play an important
role in explaining the educational attainment across countries.
One caveat is that it is difficult to measure the true effect of each labor market friction
on college attainment using this simple regression analysis. However, we can compare each
coefficient in order to get an intuition about the relative importance of each factor. In the
sample, the standard deviation of job finding rate is 0.36. The coefficient of job finding
rate on college attainment rate is estimated as 0.072. As a result, if the job finding rate
increased by one standard deviation, the college attainment rate would increase by about 2.5
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percent. Similarly, since the standard deviation of separation rate is 0.01 and the coefficient
is estimated as 16.14, the college attainment rate would increase by 19.2 percent when
there is one standard deviation increase in the separation rate. As for the employment-to-
employment transition rate, the sample standard deviation is 0.01. The coefficient of the
employment-to-employment transition rate is estimated as -14.81, which implies that if there
were one standard deviation increase in the employment-to-employment transition rate, then
the college attainment rate would decrease by 19.6 percent.
2.3 MODEL
2.3.1 Environment
We extend the job search model with on-the-job search proposed by Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) by introducing schooling choices before entering the labor market. Time is continuous
with an infinite horizon and only steady states are considered for tractability. There is a
continuum of firms and workers, each of measure one. Firms are immortal and heterogenous
in terms of their productivity. Let us denote by H(p) the proportion of firms whose produc-
tivity is less than p. It is assumed that H(p) is continuously differentiable and has a finite
support of [p, p]. Workers are mortal and leave the labor market at rate ρ. Each retiree is
replaced with a newly born worker, who makes a schooling decision before entering the labor
market. The worker without a college degree, called ‘unskilled worker’ (i = 0) hereafter,
produces p + s0 when she is employed at the firm with productivity p, but the worker with
a college degree, called ‘skilled worker’ (i = 1), produces p+ s1 at the same firm. Both firms
and worker discount future at rate r.
The newly born worker decides whether to enter the labor market as an unskilled worker
or as a college-educated worker before entering the labor market. Once she decides to go to
college, she will enter the labor market as a skilled worker after college. The idiosyncratic
preferences for higher education, ε, is assumed to follow a (standard) logistic distribution,
Logistic(µ, σ). It is assumed that µ < 0 due to college tuition, living cost and so on. Then,
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the implied college enrollment probability is given by
ψ = [1 + exp [−(exp(−∆(r + ρ))U1 − U0 + µ)/σ]]−1, (2.2)
where ∆ represents the duration for college education and (U0, U1) are the expected values
of unemployment without and with a college degree, respectively. We borrow the schooling
decision function from Ishimaru et al. (2015).
All individuals are either unemployed or employed. If a worker is unemployed, she collects
unemployment benefit b and has a chance to get a job with an exogenous contact rate λU .
The lifetime value of an unemployed worker, whether she has a college degree or not, is given
by
rUi = b− ρUi + λU
∫
max{Wi(x)− Ui, 0}dFi(x) for each i ∈ {0, 1}, (2.3)
where Fi is the cumulative distribution of offered wages and Wi(x) represents the lifetime
value of the employed worker receiving wage x. The left-hand side of equation (2.3) repre-
sents the opportunity cost of holding asset ‘i-type unemployment,’ and the right-hand side
indicates the flow value of unemployment benefit, the losses from retirement, and the net
gains from job-finding.
The employed worker earning ωi faces layoff risk at rate δ, and gets an offer from another
job with an exogenous contact rate λE,
rWi(ωi) = ωi − ρWi + δ(Ui −Wi(ωi)) + λE
∫
max{Wi(x)−Wi(ωi), 0}dFi(x). (2.4)
A job operated by an unskilled worker accrues revenues p + s0 to the firm and pays ω0
to the worker, and a job with a skilled worker accrues p + s1 and pays w1 to the workers,
where p is firm’s productivity and si is the worker’s productivity (s1 > s0). Let Ji(ωi, p) be
the firm’s value of the match producing pi + si and paying ωi, given by
rJi(ωi, p) = p+ si − ωi − [ρ+ δ + λE(1− Fi(ωi))]Ji(ωi, p), for each i ∈ {0, 1}. (2.5)
Each firm posts a vacancy at every instant. Once the vacancy is matched with a worker,
it immediately starts producing and pays the pre-committed skill-dependent wage. Let
{u0, u1} denote the masses of unskilled and skilled unemployed workers, respectively. In
addition, let {G0(ω0), G1(ω1)} be the proportion of skilled and unskilled workers with wages
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no greater than {ω0, ω1}, respectively. The firm with productivity p ∈ [p, p] optimally posts
{ω0(p), ω1(p)} to maximize the following expected value∑
s=0,1
[
(λUui + λEGi(ωi(p)))Ji(ωi(p), p)
]
. (2.6)
The first-order-conditions with respect to ω0(p) and ω1(p) implies
λUui + λEGi(ωi(p))
λEJi(ωi(p), p)
=
λUui + λEGi(ωi(p))
r + ρ+ δ + λE(1− Fi(ωi(p)))
∂Fi(ωi(p))
∂ωi
+
∂Gi(ωi(p))
∂ωi
, (2.7)
for each i ∈ {0, 1}. Given workers’ on-the-job search behaviors, it is natural to think that
a more productive firm offers a higher value so that it will not allow any less productive
poaching firms on equilibrium. It implies that
Fi(ωi(p)) = H(p) and
∂H
∂p
=
∂Fi(ωi)
∂ωi
∂ωi(p)
∂p
for each i ∈ {0, 1}. (2.8)
Given firms’ productivity distribution H(p), the steady state equilibrium with schooling
decision and on-the-job search consists of the value function {Wi, Ui, Ji}i=0,1 and steady state
measures ({Fi, ui, Gi}i=0,1), which jointly satisfies the following conditions:
(i) Given {Fi}i∈{0,1}, workers make an optimal decision regarding job turnover from equa-
tions (2.3) and (2.4), which jointly determine {Ui,Wi}i=∈{0,1}.
(ii) Given {Ui}i∈{0,1}, the newly born workers make schooling decisions prior to the labor
market entry through (2.2).
(iii) Given H(p) and {Fi}i=∈{0,1}, each recruiting firm with productivity p optimally posts a
pair of wages (ω0(p), ω1(p)) such that it satisfies the first order condition (2.7), which
determines {Ji}i∈{0,1} through (2.5).
(iv) {Fi, ui, Gi}i∈{0,1} are uniquely determined.
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2.3.2 Characterization of the Steady State Equilibrium
Let us first consider the steady state worker flow and implied distributions. In the steady
state equilibrium,
(ρ+ λU)u0 = δG0(ω0(p)) + ρ(1− ψ) and (ρ+ δ)G0(ω0(p)) = u0λU . (2.9)
It implies that
u0 =
(ρ+ δ)(1− ψ)
(ρ+ δ + λU)
and G0(ω0(p)) =
λU
ρ+ δ
u0. (2.10)
Let s(t) be the steady state measure of college students who have spent t < (∆) years in
schooling. Equating the inflow into and the outflow from the pool of ‘students,’ yields that
ρψdt = (1− ρdt)(s(∆)− s(∆− dt)) + ρdts(∆− dt) + o(dt2). (2.11)
The left-hand side represents the inflow and the right-hand side represents the outflow due
to graduation toward labor force and early retirement toward non-labor force. Dividing both
sides by dt, sending dt to zero, and solving the differential equation yields
s(∆) = ψ − ψ exp(−ρ∆). (2.12)
Since u1 + s(∆) +G1(ω1(p)) = ψ and λUG1(ω1(p)) = (ρ+ δ)u1, we obtain
u1 =
(ρ+ δ)ψ exp(−ρ∆)
ρ+ δ + λU
and G1(ω1(p)) =
λU
ρ+ δ
u1. (2.13)
The unemployed worker finds a job with wage payment no greater than ωi at rate λUFi(ωi).
The worker working at a job with wages less than ωi switches to a higher valued job at rate
λE(1 − Fi(ωi)), is laid off at rate δ, and retires at rate ρ. The steady state measure Gi(ωi)
is characterized by
λUFi(ωi)ui = (ρ+ δ + λE(1− Fi(ωi)))Gi(ωi). (2.14)
Taking derivative of (2.14) with respect to ωi and reordering yields
∂Gi(ωi)
∂ωi
=
λuui + λEGi(ωi)
ρ+ δ + λE(1− Fi(ωi))
∂Fi(ωi)
∂ωi
, for each i ∈ {1, 2}. (2.15)
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Finally, solving differential equation (2.15) yields
Gi(ωi) =
1
Ii(ωi)
∫ ωi
ωi
Ii(x)λUfi(x)ui
ρ+ δ + λE(1− Fi(x))dx, (2.16)
where
Ii(x) = exp
[ ∫ x
ωi
−λEfi(z)
ρ+ δ + λE(1− Fi(z))dz
]
. (2.17)
In equilibrium, the least productive firm should attract only unemployed workers. It
optimally posts (W0(ω0(p)),W1(ω1(p))) = (U0, U1). Lemma 1, together with F0(ω0(p)) =
F1(ω1(p)) = G0(ω0(p)) = G1(ω1(p)) = 0, determines the initial values of the system of dif-
ferential equations.
Lemma 1 Suppose that (U0, U1) are given. Equation (2.2) determines ψ. The least produc-
tive firm posts
ωi(p) = (r + ρ)Ui − λE
λU
[(r + ρ)Ui − b], for each i ∈ {0, 1}, (2.18)
which results in
Wi(ωi(p)) =
ωi(p) + δUi
r + ρ+ δ
+
λE((r + ρ)Ui − b)
(r + ρ+ δ)λU
, and (2.19)
Ji(ωi(p), p) =
p+ si − ωi(p)
r + ρ+ δ + λE
for each i ∈ {0, 1}. (2.20)
Given the initial values (2.18)-(2.20) and Gi(ωi(p)) = 0, the steady state equilibrium is
characterized by the initial value problem (IVP) having the following system of differential
equations.
dWi(ωi)
dωi
dωi(p)
dp
=
1
r + ρ+ δ + λE(1−H(p))
dωi(p)
dp
, (2.21)
dJi(ωi(p), p)
dp
=
1
r + ρ+ δ + λE(1−H(p))
[
1− dωi(p)
dp
+ λEJi(ωi, p)
dH(p)
dp
]
,(2.22)
dGi(ωi(p))
dωi
dωi(p)
dp
=
λUui + λEGi(ωi)
ρ+ δ + λE(1−H(p))
dH(p)
dp
, and (2.23)
dωi(p)
dp
= λEJi(ωi(p), p)
[
1 +
r + ρ+ δ + λE(1−H(p))
ρ+ δ + λE(1−H(p))
]dH(p)
dp
. (2.24)
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Lemma 1 says that the whole system can be pinned down at a fixed point problem in
the R× R space. Taking (U0, U1) as given, we get the whole description of the steady state
equilibrium. In equilibrium, the lifetime values of (U0, U1) should be consistent with (2.3).
Since the analytical proof of the existence and uniqueness of the result is somewhat chal-
lenging, we replace it with numerical experiments with different initial guesses in Section 3.
This section ends with the following Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 Given p ∈ [p, p], dω0(p)
dp
< dω1(p)
dp
if and only if J0(ω0(p), p) < J1(ω1(p), p).
To understand the implications of Lemma 2, it is important to recognize the key proper-
ties of the model. In the model presented, once the agents are in the labor market, employed
workers randomly search for jobs that offer higher wages than their existing jobs. Unem-
ployed workers look for jobs that offer more than their reservation wages. The firms, taking
into account the search characteristics and the wage distribution in the market, post their
own wages. Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show that in a simpler job-search model, there is
an equilibrium in which the economy supports a variety of wages for workers that are equally
productive. Our model is similar in the sense that, for each education group, the firm knows
that the labor force available for the job evolves with the employers wage. Firms that can
offer higher wages can keep the worker for a longer time at the steady-state. Also, they
can hold a larger work force because they will attract more workers to the company. Given
the heterogeneity in the education of workers, firms compete with each other to attract the
high-skilled workers because the college educated workers can contribute to the productivity
of the firm more than the high school graduates. Lemma 2 shows that in order to keep
the skilled workers, the wages posted will be higher particularly by those firms with higher
productivity. By doing so, firms award the skilled worker to attract them. This implies that
the increase in wages that unskilled worker faces is quite lower during his career path and
generates a more suppressed wage relative to the wages of the skilled worker in the market
equilibrium. In other words, highly productive firms want to differentiate themselves and
prevent low productive firms from stealing their workers by offering high wages. This will
generate a large pool of skilled workers working for high productivity firms in this economy
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at the steady-state.
Let us also explain the mechanisms that are at play regarding the workers’ problem. The
aforementioned firms’ equilibrium strategy can help a college educated worker move up the
wage ladder faster compared to a high school graduate given the labor market conditions.
This generates higher incentives for college education among agents making an education-
related decision. However, there is also the standard holdup problem that emerges in an
economy with labor market frictions. Because wage contracts are not determined at the
time the schooling decision is made, a high school graduate can have less incentive to invest
in college education. Had we assumed wage determination by Nash bargaining, the holdup
problem might be exacerbated particularly when the workers’ bargaining power is low. This
would lead to a larger mismatch between returns to schooling at the aggregate level and
workers’ private returns. However, our model abstracts from a match function and Nash
bargaining, so holdup problem is not relatively an issue.
Labor market frictions have a critical role in the wages posted. As mentioned, when
firms post wages, they take into account the market conditions, the distribution of firm
productivities, and the workers’ schooling level. Firms are sorted with respect to their
productivities over an employment spell of a worker because only high-productivity firms
can post high wages. If the job-finding rate falls, there is less competition for attracting
skilled workers. Therefore, firms post lower wages. If separation rate falls, then the worker
has higher chances to move up on the wage ladder by accepting jobs that offer higher wages.
Consequently, firms post higher wages in order to maintain the size of their labor force.
Last, if job-to-job transition rate falls, low productivity firms post higher wages, whereas
high productivity firms post lower wages. The intuition behind this result is that we see
tighter competition among the low productivity firms because they will face a more rapid
flow of workers in and out of the jobs. Also, the competition among high productivity firms
is lower because they are positioned at the right end of the distribution. Hence, few workers
will be able to reach that level of wages because of low job turnover rates. Whenever high
productivity firms face tighter competition to attract more educated workers and post higher
wages, it increases the value of college education for high school graduates and induces a
higher share of college graduates in the model.
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2.3.3 Equilibrium Life-time Value and Schooling Decision
In this subsection, we provide an illustrative example to discuss how an individual makes a
college decision by taking into account the value of his labor market career. Figure 2 displays
equilibrium supports of life-time value for skilled and unskilled worker, respectively.
Figure 2: Equilibrium Support of Life-time Values
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At the steady-state equilibrium, the value of unemployment is equal to the value of
employment for the marginal worker. This means that the marginal worker is indifferent
between the two states. The schooling decision depends on the value of unemployment for
high school and college graduates. An individual decides whether to go to college prior to
labor market entry by taking into account the difference between the value of labor market
career together with schooling cost. Note that the value of unemployment for an unskilled
worker can be interpreted as an opportunity cost of choosing college education. Unskilled
workers could move up on the wage ladder through on-the-job search during those four years
that skilled workers are getting college education. This implies that the worker’s opportunity
cost of college education is the present value of unemployment discounted by schooling time,
which is displayed in Figure 2.
The support of the lifetime value for the unskilled people is quite different from the
support of the value of the skilled people. When high school graduates choose to go to
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college or not, they compare the discounted value of the life time value of the skilled people.
After the lifetime values are discounted by the retirement rate and the interest rate together
with schooling time, the support of the values almost overlap, leaving small differential in
the supports between the two groups.
2.4 CALIBRATION
2.4.1 Calibration Strategy
This section calibrates the model based on the U.S. labor market data and provides the quan-
titative assessment of the channels that labor market friction affects for workers’ schooling
decision before they enter the labor market entry. In calibrating the model, we exoge-
nously fix the interest rate and retirement rate, and then determine the other parameters,
(δ, λU , λE, µ, σ, s, η, b), using the method of simulated moments. The information in the sam-
ple that is used to define the estimator is given by M . Under the data generating process of
the model, Mˆ(θ) is assumed to be the analogous characteristics, where θ is the vector of all
parameters to be calibrated. Then, the estimator is given by
θˆW = argmin
θ∈Θ
(M − Mˆ(θ))′W (M − Mˆ(θ)), (2.25)
where W is a symmetric, positive-definite matrix and Θ is the parameter space. The weight-
ing matrix, W , is a diagonal matrix and the elements of this matrix are equal to the variance
of the corresponding elements of M . In order to prevent giving some parameter an extremely
large weight (in the event that some parameter closely matches the value of targeted mo-
ment), all the inverse of the variance are top-coded. Then, by giving the weight W , we look
for θ that makes M − Mˆ(θ) as close to zero as possible.
Panel A in Table 2 shows exogenous parameters based on available evidence for the U.S.
The annual interest rate is chosen to be five percent, which means that the discount factor
r is set to be 0.0125 (Flinn and Mullins, 2015). The retirement rate is assumed to be 0.008,
which implies that workers participate in the labor market for roughly 30 years on average.
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Without loss of generality, the worker fixed effect on productivity for an unskilled worker s0 is
normalized as zero. Hence, we denote schooling effect by s > 0. The support of productivity
distribution is also normalized as certain range–i.e., p ∈ [1, 3].
Table 2: Parameters
Panel A: Exogenous parameters
Parameter Concept Value Source / Criteria
r Rate of time preference 0.0125 5% annual interest rate
ρ Retirement shock 0.0080 30 years of life-time
Panel B: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Concept Value Target Data Model
Schooling Decision
µ Schooling cost -12.64 Tuition-income ratio 0.507 0.507
σ Schooling Preference 12.00 College attainment rate 0.312 0.290
Worker Flow
λU Job finding rate 1.347 Unemployment spell 0.738 0.738
δ Separation rate 0.070 Unemployment rate 0.055 0.055
Labor Compensation
b Unemployment benefit 0.296 Replacement rate 0.400 0.400
s Schooling effect 0.591 College premium 1.442 1.436
η Distribution shape 6.089 Mm-ratio 1.849 1.916
λE Job turnover rate 0.683 Mm-ratio of unskilled 1.810 1.718
The schooling cost parameter µ is directly pinned down by the tuition-income ratio. The
average annual wages w for a white male with a four-year college degree is 57,762 dollars
(U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, Table 232) and the
average annual tuition c for four-year college is 26,021 dollars in 2010.10 Let us denote the
flow value of average annual income and schooling cost by w˜ and c˜, respectively. Then, the
average annual income and schooling cost can be interpreted as follows,
w =
∫ 4
0
w˜e−(r+ρ)tdt and c =
∫ 16
0
c˜e−(r+ρ)tdt, (2.26)
which is paid for over four quarters. Hence, the ratio of tuition to income (c˜/w˜) is computed
as 0.507. We target this moment by considering the ratio of flow value of schooling cost µ
to average wage for college graduates.
10The data source is OECD (2015), Education spending (indicator). For more detailed information, see
https://data.oecd.org/eduresource/education-spending.htm.
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Through the equation for probability of schooling choice (2.2), the preference for school-
ing σ determines college attainment rate. The empirical counterpart of the college attainment
rate is 31.2 percent.11 The preference parameter σ is set to be 12.0.
The job finding rate λU determines quarterly unemployment duration, which is 0.738
quarters.12 Once λU is set to match unemployment duration, unemployment rate for each
education group ui is determined by separation rate δ, through the equations (2.10) and
(2.13). By summing up unemployment rate for each education group, we measure the ag-
gregate unemployment rates, weighting by the steady state number of college students s(∆)
as follows:
u =
u0 + u1
1− s(∆) .
The empirical counterpart of the unemployment rate is 5.5 percent.
We consider the unemployment benefits b to match the replacement rate as 40 percent
of minimum wages. The schooling effect s governs the college wage premium, which is here
defined as the average wage ratio of college graduates to high school graduates.
As one summary statistic for wage dispersion, we use the ratio of the mean to the
minimum wage (Mm-ratio: E(w)/w), which is proposed by Hornstein et al. (2011). Our
computation of the Mm-ratio based on the U.S. Current Population Survey March, 1980-
2010 shows that Mm-ratio for high school graduates is 1.81 and 1.832 for college graduates.
The overallMm-ratio is 1.849.13 Based on past literatures’ value of this measure, which varies
between 1.7 and 1.9, our values of the measure are consistent. To target these moments,
we calibrate the shape parameter η of the offer distribution H(p) and the job turnover rate
λE. Given some plausible parameter values, Hornstein et al. (2011) show that most search
models with a homogenous worker and firm generate a high enough reservation wage so that
the observed Mm-ratio in the U.S. economy cannot be matched. However, we consider the
framework in which workers face a different labor market and firms offer different wages
based on workers’ education level. Hence, our calibrated version of the model generates
11The college attainment rate is borrowed from Barro and Lee (2013). We restrict the sample only for age
25 over who completed tertiary education.
12The median unemployment duration is 9.6 weeks, which is equivalent to 0.738 quarters. The data source
is from US. Bureau of Labor Statistics. For more detailed information, see https://research.stlouisfed.
org/fred2/series/UEMPMED/.
13In order to reduce the measurement error, we truncate each side of the sample for five percent.
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enough wage dispersion. Note that even though we do not target the Mm-ratio of a skilled
worker, which is 1.832 in the data, the model generates a consistent value of the moment,
which is 1.835.
2.4.2 Schooling Choice
In this subsection, we discuss how an individual makes a college education decision. When a
worker with only a high school degree goes into the labor market, his life-time value is given
by the weighted average of W0(t) and U0(t), where t is a period of being a worker. Unlike
a worker with a high school degree, the values for college graduates get discounted by the
flow value of education costs. This value is given as
Vt = exp(−φ(r + ρ))U(t) + µ(1− exp(−(φ− 4(t− 1))(r + ρ)))
(1− exp(−φ(r + ρ))) for t = 1, 2, 3, 4.
where φ is a total quarter of college education and is assumed to be 16 quarters.
Table 3 shows how the life-time values of each education group change over time. When
a worker with a high school degree enters into the labor market, an individual who chooses
college education gets discounted life-time value since he will start his career after four years
of education. Hence, at the starting point, high school graduates have higher values. After
two years, the life-time values of college graduates become higher because it is discounted only
by the remaining period of education. This shows that in the beginning, as the high school
graduates’ life-time value exceeds the college graduates’, the opportunity cost of choosing
a college education is high. However, as time goes by, college graduates catch up to high
school graduates. The last column of Table 3 displays the steady state life time values for
each education group.
Table 3: Changes in the life-time Value
Life-time Values after · · · Values at
0 yr 1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs · · · Steady State
Skilled 36.479 43.363 50.895 59.136 68.154 · · · 70.017
Unskilled 47.893 48.873 49.096 49.204 49.264 · · · 49.250
Gap -11.415 -5.510 1.799 11.724 18.890 · · · 20.767
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If a worker with a high school degree climbs the wage ladder while a college student gets
education for a four-year education, the wage earning distribution can be a measure of the
opportunity cost. This opportunity cost changes over time and depends on how fast the
worker climbs the ladder, which is dependent on the labor market friction.
Figure 3: Simulated Distributions of Wage Earnings by High School Graduates
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In order to investigate the changes in the opportunity cost, we simulate the model.
Figure 3 shows the simulated distributions of wage earnings by high school graduates. Each
distribution shows the wage earnings distribution at each year after the labor market entry.
For example, if workers worked for two years right after high school graduation, then their
wage earned would follow the ‘2nd yr wage earned’ distribution in the figure. As shown
in the figure, the distribution shifts to right for four years after high school graduation.
This shows that workers with a high school degree typically start their labor market careers
in low wage but move to better paid job through on-the-job search. When an individual
makes a schooling decision, he considers how fast he can move up the wage ladder on the job
without a college degree. This can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of giving up college
education. If this opportunity cost is large enough, the college attainment may decrease.
In addition to impacting opportunity cost, the college attainment rate is affected by how
long workers can exploit their human capital on the job. Manuelli and Seshadri (2009),
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Co´rdoba and Ripoll (2013), and Restuccia and Vandenbroucke (2014) find that adult mor-
tality rate is one of the most important factors to explain cross country schooling differences.
The intuition behind this is that changes in mortality (so as life-expectancy) heavily affect
the present value of labor earnings, which is crucial for schooling choice. For a similar rea-
son, in our paper, the duration plays a key role of schooling decision. The duration can be
expressed as follows
EDe =
∫ ∞
0
(ρ+ λU)e
−(ρ+λU )t2
(
t2 +
λU
ρ+ λU
∫ ∞
0
(ρ+ δ)e−(ρ+δ)t1(t1 +
δ
ρ+ δ
EDe)dt1
)
dt2.
At t2 = 0, the total employment duration becomes
EDe =
1
ρ
λU
ρ+ δ + λU
. (2.27)
When t1 goes to zero, the above equation can be interpreted as the unemployment duration
Du =
1
ρ
ρ+ δ
ρ+ δ + λU
. (2.28)
It is clear that changes in retirement shock ρ, job finding rate λU , and separation rate δ affect
the total duration of employment and unemployment. Retirement shock ρ has a negative
effect on both the employment and unemployment duration. As job finding rates λU increase,
an unemployed searcher can easily get a job, which implies that the unemployment duration
gets shorter and the employment duration gets longer. Also, as separation rate δ increases,
employed workers are more likely to be unemployed, which induces longer unemployment
duration and shorter employment duration.
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2.4.3 Comparative Statics
We, now, discuss the implications of the model for the relationship between educational
attainment and labor market search frictions. We compare the results of the U.S. baseline
economy to those of the economy with a different level of search friction, keeping all else
constant. Table 4 shows the results of the experiment, illustrating the effect of job finding
rate λU , separation rate δ, and employment-to-employment transition rate on schooling.
First, we lower the job finding rate λU by one standard deviation. In the data, as we
have discussed in Section 2.2, the college attainment decreases by 2.6 percent when the job
finding rate decreases by one standard deviation. In our calibrated version of the model,
compared to the result of baseline economy, college attainment decreases by 1.3 percent,
when there is a one-standard deviation decrease in job finding rate. This implies that the
model accounts for almost half of the effect of job finding rate on educational attainment.
When the job finding rate decreases, the unemployment duration increases. This means that
the period that a worker exploits the human capital shortens. Therefore, the duration effect
reduces college attainment rate.
Table 4: Comparative Statics on Schooling
Decrease one Data Model
stddev in Data % change Model % change
Job finding rate 0.273 -0.026 0.277 -0.013
Separation rate 0.226 -0.192 0.277 -0.011
EE Transition rate 0.335 0.196 0.287 0.024
Next, we experiment the case in which there is a one-standard deviation decrease in
separation risk δ in the economy. This generates two different effects. First, an increase in
the job separation rate δ induces longer unemployment duration. This implies that a worker
faces lesser time that he can exploit his human capital on the job. Because of the changes
in unemployment duration, the college attainment may decrease. Second, a worker with a
high school degree faces higher chance to be separated from the job. That is, there is lower
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probability to move up on the wage ladder because of higher separation rate. This leads a
worker to get more education before entering the labor market. As shown in Table 4, it seems
that the latter effect dominates the former one. In the data, the college attainment decreases
by roughly 19 percent in one standard deviation of separation rate, while it decreases by 1.1
percent in the model.
By decreasing the employment-to-employment transition rate by one standard deviation,
the college attainment rate increases by 2.4 percent. Compared to the baseline economy,
the employment-to-employment transition rate is lower, which implies that a worker with
only a high school degree cannot easily move up on the wage ladder on the job while his
counterpart is in college. Hence, the opportunity cost of getting a college education is lower,
which increases college attainment rate.
Even though we mainly focus on the effect of labor market frictions on educational
attainment, it is worthwhile to look at the effect of the retirement shock ρ. With the available
data, we arbitrarily change the retirement shock. When we reduce the total employment
period by five years, the college attainment rate decreases by about 8.4 percent compared
to the baseline economy. This is because a decrease in ρ extends the period that a worker
exploits his human capital on the job. More specifically, as their expected unemployment
duration is shorter, they are more likely to choose higher education rather than enter the
labor market earlier.
2.5 EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the efficiency properties regarding college attainment in the model.
We, following Sim (2015), consider the problem of the constrained planner who maximizes
the present value of the expected output flow by a newly born worker throughout her life.
An unskilled worker is expected to produce p+s0 when she works at a firm with productivity
p, whereas a skilled worker is to produce p + s1. The present value of the expected output
flow by an unskilled and skilled worker working at a firm with productivity p is denoted by
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S0e(p) and S1e(p), respectively. For each i ∈ {0, 1},
rSie(p) = p+ si − ρSie(p) + δ(Siu − Sie(p)) + λE
∫ p
p
[Sie(p
′)− Sie(p)]dH(p′), (2.29)
where Siu represents the present value of the expected output flow by an i-type unemployed
worker. Regardless of their education, both college and non-college graduate workers produce
b through non-market activity when they are unemployed, which is given by
rSiu = b− ρSiu + λU
∫ p
p
[Sie(p
′)− Siu]dH(p′). (2.30)
Then, the social planner makes schooling decisions on behalf of individual workers as follows.
Given idiosyncratic preference ε, the planner sends the worker to college if and only if
exp(−(r + ρ)∆)S1u + ε ≥ S0u. (2.31)
Applying ‘integration by part’ to (2.29) and combining it with (2.30) yields[
r+ρ+ δ− λUδ
r + ρ+ δ
]
Siu = b+
λU
r + ρ+ δ
[1
2
(p2−p2) + si(p−p) +
∫ p
p
λEE[Se(p′)|p′ ≥ p]dp
]
,
(2.32)
where
E[Se(p′)|p′ ≥ p] =
∫ p
p
1−H(p′)
r + ρ+ δ + λE(1−H(p′))dp
′, (2.33)
and
d(S0u − exp(−(r + ρ)∆)S1u)
dλE
= [1− exp(−(r + ρ)∆)]E[Se(p′)|p′ ≥ p]
× λU
r + ρ+ δ
[
r + ρ+ δ − λUδ
r + ρ+ δ
]−1
. (2.34)
In particular, as ∆→ 0, the planner’s schooling decision becomes independent of λE. While
the planner’s schooling decision is not directly affected by the job turnover rate, individual’s
schooling decision in the market equilibrium is negatively associated with the job turnover
rate. It suggests the possibility of under- and over-education from an efficiency perspective.
Figure 4 displays the opportunity cost of college education at the high school graduation
date. When an individual makes a college education decision, he may compare the expected
value of labor market career as a high school and college graduate. Panels (a) and (b)
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in Figure 4 clearly show that there is over-investment in schooling compared to the social
planner’s problem if we compare the discounted life-time values of high school and college
graduates–i.e., ∆UM > ∆UP .
Figure 4: The Opportunity Cost of Schooling at High School Graduation
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The previous literature, such as Charlot and Decreuse (2005), Charlot and Decreuse
(2010), and Flinn and Mullins (2015), also discuss about the market efficiency in educa-
tion investment. Charlot and Decreuse (2005) and Charlot and Decreuse (2010) develop a
matching model with educational choice and show that there might exist over-investment in
education under search frictions. In their set-up, the firm’s conditional expectation on ability
of workers is affected by the schooling decisions of workers. That is, more workers choosing
college education becomes negative externality for the market. Since the social planner does
not internalize the negative externality, the social planner forces workers with low ability to
not choose college education. Hence, compared to the social planner problem, the market
equilibrium generates over-investment in education. Even though Flinn and Mullins (2015)
use a similar model, they predict a different result. This is because their results highly de-
pend on the surplus sharing rule. The under-investment in education in Flinn and Mullins
(2015) result from weakness in the workers’ bargaining position. One thing worth noticing
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is that Charlot and Decreuse (2005), Charlot and Decreuse (2010) and Flinn and Mullins
(2015) overlook the opportunity cost during the schooling period by assuming no time cost
for schooling.
As mentioned in the previous section, the over-investment in college education problem
might be resolved by increasing the opportunity cost of entering the labor market as high
school graduates. That is, if workers with only a high school degree have more stable jobs,
then the college attainment would decrease. The second column of Table 5 shows the market
efficiency of educational investment when there is higher opportunity cost compared to the
benchmark economy. Even though the college attainment rate decreases by 3.7 percent, the
rate generated by the social planner also decreases by almost same amount. Hence, in this
case, the college attainment would still be high enough to raise the over-investment problem,
unlike the problem of college attainment under a social planner.
Improving the quality of college education is another way to improve educational attain-
ment’s social efficiency. As the quality increases, the gap between the market equilibrium
level of college attainment and social efficient level gets narrrower. The third column of Table
5 shows that under our parameterizations if the quality of college education increases by 38
percent in terms of productivity, then the market equilibrium college attainment achieves
the social efficient level.
Table 5: Social Efficiency in Education Investment
B.E.
Increase in Increase in
job security of unskilled quality of education
ME 0.296 - +
PP 0.278 - +
Ratio 1.065 + -
30
2.6 CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes the channel through which labor market friction affects individuals’
schooling decision prior to labor market entry. It demonstrates that a country with a higher
job turnover rate and/or lower job separation rate tends to incur a higher opportunity cost
of schooling and maintain a lower college attainment rate. The calibrated model reconciling
the U.S. data predicts that the market equilibrium results in over-investment in schooling
from an efficiency perspective. The opportunity cost of schooling (compared to the expected
gains from it) at the time of high school graduation is smaller in the market equilibrium
than the planner’s problem.
Naturally, the next step in this research is to study how experience on the job and on-
the-job training affect the choice of college attainment. We conjecture that if workers with
only a high school degree could get on-the-job training or work experience, then they would
climb the wage ladder faster for the first four years. As a result, the opportunity cost of
college education would increase, lowering college attainment. We leave this topic for future
research.
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3.0 POLICY-INDUCED VARIATION IN COLLEGE LABOR SUPPLY AND
THE SKILL PREMIUM1
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Two well-documented educational trends have affected most advanced economies. First,
there is a broad increase in educational attainment (Restuccia and Vandenbroucke, 2013b).
Second, there has been a general increase in the educational wage premium, whether mea-
sured as the estimated return to an additional year of schooling or as the college-high school
wage premium (Machin and Van Reenen, 1998; Bekman et al., 1998; Katz and David, 1999).
The goal of this paper is to explore whether these two trends are linked through composition
effects.2 The idea is that the expansion of college is likely to have changed the average ability
of high school and college graduates, where ability is understood broadly as unobserved char-
acteristics that affect wages. We want to know whether these changes may have contributed
to the rise in college wage premiums.
An existing literature has sought to explore this question with a primary focus on the
United States. Here, we revisit these questions in the context of Korea. Korea experienced
an educational expansion and wages changes similar to those in other advanced economies,
as can be seen in Figure 5.3 Figure 5a shows the educational attainment of Koreans by birth
cohort, with attainment measured in four complete and mutually exclusive categories: those
with less than a high school degree; high school graduates; those with more than a high
1This research is a joint work with Jaehan Cho and Todd Shoellman
2By contrast, a well-known alternative literature explores a link through relative price effects: if workers
with different education levels are imperfect substitutes, then changes in relative supply necessarily affect
relative wages. However, this force generally tends to imply a decline in the college wage premium, all other
things equal, and so is not helpful in understand recent experiences (Katz and Murphy, 1992).
3Details on the construction of this and subsequent data are delayed to Section 3.2.
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school degree but less than a four-year college degree; and four-year college graduates. The
expansion of education is clear: while 90 percent of the 1930 cohort did not graduate high
school, today more than half of the Korean population attends college. Figure 5b shows the
college wage premium by year from 1980 onward. The wage premium fluctuated until 1995
but has risen 15–20 log points since that time.
Figure 5: Changes in Korean Education
(a) Expansion of Education
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While the broad patterns in Korea are similar to those of other advanced economies,
Korea does offer one special advantage: the expansion of education was unusually large and
rapid. For example, about thirty years separate the first birth cohort to achieve 10 percent
college graduation and the first to achieve 30 percent college graduation in the United States;
the same figure is about ten years in Korea. And while the college graduation rate has leveled
off at about 30 percent in the United States it has risen to roughly 40 percent in Korea.
To exploit this rapid expansion of education we adopt two different empirical strategies
previously used in the literature to quantify various channels through which educational
attainment might affect wages. While the exact identifying assumptions vary by strategy,
they all share in common the idea of comparing educational wage premiums across cohorts
with different educational attainment at a given point in time. Korea offers a clear advantage
for such empirical approaches because of the larger differences in educational attainment for
nearby cohorts, which we exploit.
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We then go a step further than the existing literature by exploiting a policy-induced
expansion of educational attainment. The Korean government limited university enrollment
throughout our period of interest. By the late 1970s the limit was sufficiently binding that
it encouraged the growth of a large tutoring industry that help high school students score
better on the college entrance exam. The change in government after the assassination of
President Park in 1979 brought large policy changes throughout the economy. Of particular
interest to us is a large and sudden increase in university enrollments in 1981 and 1982. Our
regression discontinuity analysis below suggests that this policy increased the post-policy
university attainment by about 3 percentage points (about 15 percent) as compared to pre-
policy trends. We exploit this exogenous increase in enrollment within the framework of the
existing empirical strategies for alternative, exogenous variation in the quantity of schooling.
Our analysis yields two main results. The first concerns the importance of composition
effects in accounting for the cross-sectional return to schooling. In line with Kaymak (2009),
we find that composition effects account for nearly one-half of the observed return to school-
ing, indicating that the true private return to schooling is slightly more than half of the
observed Mincer return. The magnitude of this effect is consistent regardless of whether we
use all educational variation or only exogenous educational variation to estimate the effect.
The second result concerns the importance of composition effects in the time series. Consis-
tent with Juhn et al. (2005), we find evidence that increasing college attainment lowers the
college wage premium for a cohort, suggesting that higher college attainment is obtained by
lowering the relative ability of college graduates. However, the results here depend some-
what on whether we use all the variation or only policy-induced variation in educational
attainment. The former suggests a small and relatively weak effect, while the latter suggests
a much stronger effect.
In addition to the papers listed above, we are also closely related to a number of other
studies that investigate similar issues, primarily within the United States. Laitner (2000)
formulates a model that generates qualitative predictions in line with what we study here,
but does not attempt to quantify these forces. Recently Bowlus and Robinson (2012) use the
flat spot method of Heckman et al. (1998b) to try to identify changes in skill prices versus skill
quantities in explaining changes in wages for four educational groups in the U.S.; changes in
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innate ability can be thought of as one source of changes in skill quantities. Carneiro and
Lee (2011) use a different empirical strategy that relies on controlling for all possible sources
of skill price variation to help identify skill quantities as a residual; again, ability is one
component of the quantity of skill. Carneiro and Lee (2011) use a local instrumental variable
approach to predict the wage implications of expanding college enrollment. Unfortunately
it is difficult to provide a consensus result from these papers because the literature has yet
to reach one. Some papers find modest composition effects (Juhn et al., 2005; Carneiro and
Lee, 2011), but others find sizable ones (Kaymak, 2009; Bowlus and Robinson, 2012). Our
hope is to provide further evidence to this debate by exploiting the advantages of the Korean
experience outlined above.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the Korean data and the
relevant details about Korean educational policy. Section 3.3 conducts the analysis. Section
4 concludes.
3.2 EDUCATION AND EDUCATION POLICY IN KOREA
In this section we outline briefly the relevant details of the Korean educational experience.
Our focus is on two main aspects. First, we highlight the post-World War II trends, which
include a large expansion of education and a recent increase in the college wage premium.
Second, we highlight the role of exogenous policy changes in the 1980s in affecting the
educational expansion.
We measure educational attainment using the Korean population censuses conducted
in 1966 and then every five years from 1970 to 2010. Throughout this period the census
has contained a question on the highest educational attainment of respondents.4 We code
respondents into four broad categories that are comparable over time: those with less than
a high school degree; high school graduates; those with more than a high school degree but
4This is also a minor advantage as compared to the United States. There the main data sources are the
Current Population Survey and the Population Census. They asked only about years of schooling and not
attainment until 1992 and 1990, which generally forces researchers to assume that, say, workers with 12 years
of schooling are high school graduates and so on.
35
less than a four-year college degree; and those with at least a four-year college degree. We
measure attainment for the 1929–1977 cohorts using the census taken when they were aged
33–37. Using this five year window with censuses taken every five years gives us exactly
one observation of attainment per cohort. The results are plotted in Figure 5a. Korea has
experienced a larger and more rapid rise in education than the United States. We show in
the appendix B.3 that similar patterns hold for men and women separately.
Examination of Figure 1 shows that a substantial fraction of Koreans have more than
a high school degree but less than a four-year college degree. A similarly large group is
present in U.S. data (Hendricks and Schoellman, 2014). However, this group contains two
subgroups: those who obtain a two-year degree and those who start college but obtain no
degree. Further, the relative proportion of the subgroups varies greatly between the U.S.
and Korea. This is shown in Figure 6. Roughly two-thirds of the “some college” group in
the U.S. consists of those who obtain no degree, whereas in Korea almost all students with
less than a four-year degree obtain a two-year degree.5
Figure 6: Decomposing the Some College Group in the U.S. and Korea
(a) Two-Year Degrees
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
1957 1962 1972 1977
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f 
A
ss
o
ci
a
te
 D
eg
re
e 
1967 
Year of Birth 
Korea
US
(b) No Degree
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
1957 1962 1967 1972 1977
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f 
C
o
ll
eg
e 
D
ro
p
o
u
ts
 
Year of Birth 
Korea
US
A final advantage of using Korean data is that variation in educational policy provides
exogenous variation in educational attainment. The most important change for our purposes
came in the summer of 1980. High school education was available to all students and paid for
5U.S. data taken from the March Current Population Survey.
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by the federal government since 1968. However, the federal government strictly controlled
university admissions. Students took two examinations to determine who would be admitted
(Lee, 1992). As the fraction of students who graduated high school rose, the restriction on
enrollment became more binding. By 1980, nearly half of all high school students were
enrolled in after-school private tutoring to help improve their college enrollment test scores.
Education policy changed discretely after the 1979 assassination of President Park. Gen-
eral Cheon assumed control of the country in 1980 and was recognized as President in 1981.
He instituted a host of reforms throughout the economy. The educational reform had two key
components. First, he banned private tutoring. Second, he greatly expanded educational
enrollments through several mechanisms: by opening new universities; by expanding the
departments per university; and by expanding the students per department. The aggregate
effect was large: total new enrollments were nearly 50 percent larger in 1981 as compared
to 1980, and enrollment in four-year degrees were 60 percent larger. This large, exogenous
increase is critical to our empirical approach.
In order to utilize the effect of this policy in our empirical work, we need to define which
cohorts were affected by it. It is clear that all cohorts who were age 19 or younger in 1981
(born 1962 or later) was affected by the policy. Those who were slightly older may have also
benefited from a second chance to enter university. This is less clear in the case of Korea,
because many who were marginally denied admission to four-year colleges would have been
accepted to and attended two-year colleges instead. Roughly two-thirds of applications to
college in the early 1980s were from high school seniors taking the college entrance for the
first time; the remainder were from repeat test-takers.6 Nonetheless, we think of those born
1962–1964 as having potentially been marginally affected by the policy. Those born before
1962 were likely not affected. Hence, we intend to exploit the large rise in college attendance
and completion between cohorts born before this time and those born just after the policy
came into effect.
Figure 7 isolates the fraction of each birth cohort that obtains at least a four-year college
degree. The vertical line marks the 1962 cohort, which was the first to be fully affected
by the policy. By comparing the attainment of cohorts on either side we can see that the
6Data from the Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1985.
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policy did indeed increase attainment. To make this statement more precise we estimate
the effect of the policy using a regression discontinuity approach. We consider the following
specification:
Sic = α + τDi + βg(c) + εi (3.1)
where the dependent variable, S, is an indicator variable that takes on value 1 if individual i
from cohort c obtained a four-year degree. We predict this value under the assumption that
there is a smooth trend relationship between attainment and cohort captured by g(c). D is
an indicator which takes the value of 1 if c ≥ 1962 and 0 otherwise. We are interested in τ ,
the estimated jump effect of the policy on educational attainment.
Figure 7: Fraction College Graduates by Birth Cohort
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Note: Figure shows college graduation rates by birth cohort, taken from the Korean census. The vertical
line indicates the birth cohort that was marginally exposed to the educational reform; younger cohorts to
the right were fully exposed, while older cohorts to the left were not exposed at all.
Table 6 gives the estimated results when we assume that the underlying trends in cohort
g(c) are captured by quadratic polynomials. We estimate a discontinuous effect of the policy
on college attainment of 3.2 percentage points (column 1), or 2.1 percentage points if we
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focus only on the fraction of students who graduate at least high school (column 3). One
slight complication is that we are using educational attainment data for people drawn from
different ages. We find that controlling of this possible confounding effect using a quartic
polynomial in age makes no difference for our results (columns 2 and 4). Thus, policy induced
a large change in college attainment in Korea. To put the figure into context, note that total
college attainment for the 1980 cohort was around 25 percent, and that the policy induced
an additional (above trend) increase of 3.2 percentage points, or roughly 12 percent of total
1980 attainment. This effect is large and gives us hope to provide alternative identification
of composition effects.
Table 6: Estimated Increase in College Attainment Induced by Policy Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dependent variable: Total Fraction Fraction of High School Graduates
0.032∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
[0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
Birth Cohort Polynomial Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic
Age Polynomial Controls No Quartic No Quartic
Initial Sample Size 253896 253896 160204 160204
Note: The dependent variables are whether the individual graduates a college. Each
coefficient is from a separate regression. Each regression includes controls for a birth
cohort quadratic polynomial and an indicator whether or not a cohort entered a college
after the educational reform. The bracketed values indicate corresponding standard errors.
Finally, we turn our attention to the evolution of the college wage premium in Korea.
The Korean census does not collect data on wages. Instead, we use the Korean Survey
Report on Wage Structure’s annual data from 1980–2011. The survey collects data about
the characteristics of workers and their compensation from firms with ten or more regular
workers.7 The important data for our purposes are each worker’s final education degree, their
age and gender, and their labor market earnings. The survey is large, containing roughly
half a million workers each year.8
7Since 1998, the sampling criteria has been extended to firms with 5 or more regular workers. We use
the information on firms with 10 or more workers only to maintain comparability of the data over time.
8Further information on this survey can be found at http://laborstat.molab.go.kr
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In order to measure the skill premium we construct a sample along the lines of Katz
and Murphy (1992). We include only full-time, full-year workers aged 18–65 who worked at
least 35 hours per week at the time of the survey. We define hourly wages using monthly
income and hours worked per month. We use the CPI to deflate all wages to 2010 dollars.
Individuals whose real wages are less than $4.11 per hour (the 2010 minimum wage) are
excluded from the sample.
We estimate the college wage premium by regressing log-hourly wages on dummies for
educational attainment, controlling for age, gender, and potential experience interacted with
gender, where potential experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus 6. The
college wage premium is the estimated coefficient for having graduated with a four-year
college degree minus the estimated coefficient for having only a high school diploma. Figure
5b shows the results. The college wage premium fluctuated between 0.3 and 0.4 between
1980 and 1995; from 1995 to 2010 it rose from about 0.3 to 0.45, with some modest signs
of falling recently. In the next section we explore whether the changes in the college wage
premium can be linked to the changes in educational attainment.
3.3 EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
We now turn to the empirical analysis. Our goal here is to consider several approaches
proposed in the literature. As we will see, these approaches generally rely on comparing
nearby birth cohorts with different education levels. Our goal is to exploit two features of
the Korean data. First, the rise in education was much sharper. Since identification rests on
comparing across cohorts, this is an advantage. Second, we have exogenous, policy-induced
variation in the supply of education.
It is useful to provide a unified treatment of the problem. To do so, we focus on the
following wage equation:
log(witc) = βt + βc + βt−c + (γt + γc + γt−c)Si + ai + εi, (3.2)
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where w denotes the hourly wage, S denotes schooling, a denotes ability, and ε is the error
term. At some points we focus on the college-high school wage premium, in which case
Si ∈ {0, 1} will denote high school and college graduates, respectively; at other we focus on
the Mincerian return to schooling, in which case S ∈ [0, S¯] will be a continuous variable.
Throughout, we use subscript i for individuals, t for time, and c for birth cohort. It follows
that t − c is age. We use βt as a shorthand for a full set of year dummies, and similarly
for the remaining βs and γs. Note that we allow both the level of wages and the return to
schooling to depend in an arbitrary way on age, year, and cohort. It is well-known that at
this level of generality these effects are not well-identified because of a linear dependence
among the three; we return to this point further below.
Our goal is to understand the role that ability plays in the patterns of average wage by
school group, given by:
E[log(witc)|S] = βt + βc + βt−c + (γt + γc + γt−c)S + E[ai|S]. (3.3)
We want to understand the importance of composition effects for wages, by which we mean
differences in E[ai|S] across cohorts and time. We will explore both discretized and contin-
uous schooling models, in which case the relevant expressions are
E[log(witc)|1]− E[log(witc)|0] = γt + γc + γt−c + E[ai|1]− E[ai|0] (3.4)
and
∂E[log(witc)|S]
∂S
= γt + γc + γt−c +
∂E[ai|S]
∂S
(3.5)
Composition effects affect wages unless E[ai|1] − E[ai|0] = 0 or ∂E[ai|S]∂S = 0. However,
quantifying composition effects is generally challenging, which likely explains the diversity
of approaches and results in the literature. There are two main obstacles. First, ability is
not observed directly. Some datasets include proxies for ability (such as standardized test
scores), but it is necessary to account for the noise inherent in test scores (Taubman and
Wales, 1972; Bishop, 1989; Hendricks and Schoellman, 2014). The Korean data, and most
other large datasets worldwide such as censuses, lack such proxies. A second challenge is that
both of these wage equations suffer from a classic collinearity between age, time, and cohort
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effects. This collinearity is worsened by the inclusion of ability conditional on schooling.
Since schooling is usually fixed by cohort in the empirical analysis, this implies that mean
ability conditional on schooling is itself another cohort effect.
In some cases it is possible to rule out the importance of age, time, or cohort effects, but
that does not appear to be the case here. It is well-known that the college wage premium
varies by age. Time effects are naturally suggested by the typical framework that models the
wages of college and high-school educated workers as a function of the quantity of workers
with the two types of skill and the prevailing level of skill-biased technical change in the
economy (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Goldin and Katz, 2008). We have already discussed that
cohort effects capture (at least) the role for differences in ability conditional on schooling.
Thus we conclude that empirical progress depends on confronting these two challenges.
We now discuss and implement the approaches suggested in the literature. Throughout, we
emphasize how composition effects can be identified and separated from time or age effects.
3.3.1 Composition Effects in the Cross-Section
Our first approach follows Kaymak (2009). Kaymak works with the continuous school model
in equation (3.2) and a linear return to schooling. He uses a cohort-based instrumental
variable approach to estimate the return to schooling. Intuitively, a valid instrument allows
one to measure the true return to schooling γt + γc + γt−c, whereas OLS estimates are
biased and yield γt + γc + γt−c +
∂E[ai|S]
∂S
. Simple subtraction yields an estimate for the
cross-sectional role of ability bias ∂E[ai|S]
∂S
. Note that this approach also sidesteps the age-
time-cohort problem by not attempting to disentangle them at all.
Kaymak proposes using cohort dummies as instruments. Cohort dummies are clearly
exogenous to an individual and highly correlated with school attainment (even more so
in Korea). It is less clear whether they satisfy the exclusion restriction. That restriction
requires that cohort only affects wages through its affect on average educational attainment.
It precludes effects that might arise through, say, labor market conditions upon first arrival to
the labor market, which would likely be common to a cohort. Kaymak (2009) proposes and
implements a number of controls to help capture such effects. Here we explore an alternative
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approach, which is to use our educational policy change as an alternative instrument that
affected schooling and satisfies the exclusion restriction.
We start by following Kaymak (2009) closely. We estimate the effect of years of schooling
on real wage using the data from the Korean Survey Report on Wage Structure.9 We
implement our regression as:
log(witc) = βt + γSi + βXi + εi.
where X includes control variables: a quartic trend in cohort (to capture slow-moving,
cohort-specific trends such as changes in mean ability (Flynn, 1984, 2007)); a quartic function
of age (to capture returns to experience); and dummies for survey year. We estimate this
equation three ways: by OLS, and then using two different instruments.
Table 7: Return to Education
Dependent V ariable : log(RealWage per Hours)
LS IV
(1) (2) (3)
100 × Years of Education 7.01*** 4.34*** 2.85***
[0.006] [0.143] [0.372]
Instruments N/A Year of Birth Educational Reform
Observations 8,018,485
R-squared 0.480 0.392 0.392
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: We include a quartic age trend, a quartic year of birth trend and
dummies for survey year. The instrument in column (2) is a full set of
birth cohort dummies; in column (3) it is a dummy for cohorts born in
the three-year window 1961–1963 who were most suddenly affected by the
educational reform.
Table 7 displays the estimation results. The estimates in columns (1) and (2) are quite
comparable to Kaymak (2009) and indicate that a little more than half of the return to
education (4.34/7.01) is true return to schooling, while the other half is due to composition
effects. In column (3) we explore our alternative instrument. Our instrument variable is
dummy for the cohorts who were born between 1962–1964. We find out that a little more
9The detailed description of the sample is provided in Appendix B.
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than one over third of the return to education (2.85/7.01) is true return to schooling and
composition effects are a little larger than the result in column (2).
We then follow Kaymak (2009) by estimating the same equation separately for each
decade. Our goal here is to assess whether the patterns of the skill premium observed in
Figure 5b are accounted for by composition effects or by changes in skill prices. The results
are given in Table 8. The least squares estimates are in line with the changes in the college
wage premium plotted in Figure 8, showing first a decline in the 1990s and then a pronounced
rise to higher levels in the 2000s. In column (2) we again show the result of instrumenting
for attainment using cohort as in Kaymak. We find evidence that the return to schooling is
increasing over time. Taking the difference between columns (1) and (2) suggests a nonlinear
pattern: ability bias was the largest in the 1980s, declined in the 1990s, and rose again in
the 2000s. In column (3) we again explore the role of using our alternative instrument that
controls 1962–1964 born cohorts. As we already show for the whole period, true return
to schooling is smaller than when we use the instrument in Kaymak. When we use our
instrument variable, true return to schooling is statistically zero in 1980s and 2000s.
Table 8: Patterns of the Return to Education: 1980–2010
LS IV
Year (1) (2) (3)
1981-1990 7.2*** 3.8*** 1.6
[0.008] [0.419] [1.495]
1991-2000 5.8*** 4.1*** 2.9***
[0.009] [0.261] [0.497]
2001-2010 8.7*** 1.9*** -0.7
[0.014] [0.269] [0.611]
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: We control for a quadratic age
trend, a quadratic trend in year of
birth, survey year, cohort size by ed-
ucation and survey year
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3.3.2 Composition Effects in the Time Series
Our second approach follows Juhn et al. (2005). These authors work with the discretized
school model in equation (3.4) and discrete schooling groups. Their approach is based on an
assumption about how cohort effects will enter the wage equation. The intuition is conveyed
by Figure 8, which draws closely on a similar figure in their paper. To simplify, suppose that
ability is (log-) normally distributed and that selection by ability into educational attainment
is perfect. In this case there is an ability cutoff for each cohort λ∗ such that all higher-ability
individuals complete college and work as college graduates, while all lower-ability individuals
do not attend college and work as high school graduates. An expansion of college attainment
means a shift left in the cutoff, so that the individuals that are shaded light gray now graduate
college instead of only completing high school. Under this simple and clear model of selection
effects, mean relative ability by cohort E(ai,t−v|s = 1) − E(ai,t−v|s = 0) can be proxied for
by using the fraction of the population that attains college for each cohort.
Figure 8: A Simplified View of Composition Effects
Ability (λ) 
denstiy f(λ) 
λ* λ* 
Addional enrollment in response 
to the education reform 
This approach obviously embeds strong assumptions about how ability effects work.
Hendricks and Schoellman (2014) find that there are two important complications to this
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view of selection effects. First, the sorting of students ability into attainment is not perfect,
as the figure suggests. Second, there are not only two mutually exclusive school categories
as that figure suggests. Hendricks and Schoellman (2014) find that both of these factors
play an important role in the U.S. Their results suggest, for example, that the expansion of
education had essentially no effect on the mean ability of college graduates, although it did
cause a decline in the mean ability of high school graduates. These findings suggest it may
be worthwhile to explore alternative assumptions.
We do so by once again exploiting our exogenous educational policy change. These
approaches exploit the idea that while long-term changes in educational attainment may
be complicated by simultaneous trends in sorting and the attainment of some college, large
short-run changes are unlikely to be. Hence, instead of asking whether the growth in college
attainment over the long run has caused changes in the college wage premium, we ask whether
the large growth in college attainment induced by the policy reform cause changes in the
affected cohorts’ college wage premium.
We start by following Juhn et al. (2005) closely. They suggest the equivalent of differ-
encing equation (3.4) over time,
∆
E[log(witc)|s = 1]
E[log(witc)|s = 0] = ∆γc + ∆γt−c + ∆[E(ai|1)− E(ai|0)].
which has the effect of netting out time effects. They assume that cohort effects and changes
in mean ability are accounted for by changes in average educational attainment, ∆γc +
∆[E(ai|1) − E(ai|0)] = ω∆[E(sitc)] We use a regression of education on age and cohort
dummies to predict for each cohort the average attainment at age 35, which we use as
E[sitc].
10
Before giving the regression results it is useful to look at the raw relationship between
the college wage premium and the fraction of the population with a college degree. The
two are plotted together in Figure 9. Each panel of this figure corresponds to one five-year
differenced comparison; for example, the top left panel shows the difference in wages and
attainment when comparing similarly aged workers between 1980 and 1985. The blue line
in each figure shows the five-year change in the college wage premium, while the red line
10The detailed description of the sample is provided in Appendix B.2.
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shows the five-year change in the fraction of the population who graduates college. The
correlation between the two is generally weak, much weaker than what Juhn et al. (2005)
find in the United States. However we also shade in each figure in gray the cohorts that were
marginally affected by the educational reform. We can see in each figure that the reform
consistently induced an unusually large increase in attainment and that the college wage
premium consistently declined.
To check these visual results we estimate the above equation using weighted least squares.
Table 9 reports the estimation results. In column (1) we follow Juhn et al. (2005) and
estimate the change in the college wage premium as a function of the change in the share of
the cohort in college. We find a negative result consistent with their work, but the estimate is
imprecise. In columns (2)–(5) we explore the value of incorporating our educational reform.
In these regressions we continue to include the share of the cohort that graduates college, but
we also include a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for cohorts that were marginally
affected by the educational reform. The difference between columns (2)–(5) lies only in the
which cohorts we define as having been affected. In column (2) we use a strict definition, the
1962–1964 cohorts. In column (3) we expand the affected cohorts to the 1962–1966 cohorts;
in column (4) we expand it to the 1962–1971 cohorts; and last in column (5) we expand it
to the 1962–1976 cohorts.
The results of regressions (2)–(5) agree closely. In each case the effect of cohort college
share is of the wrong sign and is statistically insignificant. This indicates that for cohorts
not affected by the educational reform, there is no strong relationship between the fraction
graduating college and college wage premiums. As explained above this could be the case
if offsetting forces (such as changes in the structure of education, education quality, or the
sorting of students) offset the increase in attainment. Indeed, it could be the case that such
forces are themselves responsible in part for causing the increase one educational attainment.
The regressions also agree closely on the effect of the educational reform. Marginally affected
cohorts have statistically and economically lower college wage premiums, on the order of 18–
23 log points, as compared to the unaffected cohorts (those born earlier or much later). As
we expand the scope of the number of cohorts affected, we find that the estimated effect
declines. The intuition is that the rapid expansion in education that took place at this time
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Figure 9: Log Change in Relative Wage and College Share
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was exogenous and happened too quickly to be offset by other factors. In this case, the
policy had the expected effect consistent with the findings of Juhn et al. (2005).
Our preferred interpretation of this finding is that long-run trend changes in educational
attainment may come in part from better sorting by ability or changes in educational prepa-
ration, in line with Hendricks and Schoellman (2014), while sudden short-run changes in
educational attainment cannot and hence cause stronger decreases in ability and wages.
Table 9: Effects of Cohort-Specific College Share on Wages of College Graduate Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent V ariable : ∆E[log(witc)|s=1]E[log(witc)|s=0]
Cohort College Share -0.081 -0.009 0.065 -0.011 -0.050
[0.130] [0.134] [0.136] [0.134] [0.135]
Cohort Size -0.249** -0.243** -0.275*** -0.282*** -0.269**
[0.103] [0.103] [0.101] [0.104] [0.106]
Education Reform -0.188** -0.233*** -0.129* -0.057
[0.095] [0.077] [0.066] [0.069]
Constant -0.166 -0.192 -0.211 0.214 0.419***
[0.154] [0.153] [0.152] [0.152] [0.153]
Observations 230 230 230 230 230
R-squared 0.321 0.335 0.353 0.335 0.324
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: We use wage information for the dependent variable from Re-
port on Wage Structure Survey. In each column we use predicted col-
lege share of each cohort at age 35 as specified in equation (1) in Juhn
et al. (2005). The regression also includes controls for cohort size,
seven year dummy variables, and two age dummy variables for young
and middle age workers. Education Reform is a dummy that indicates
cohorts affected by the educational reform as explained in the text.
Each column describe the cohorts who were born within 3 years in (2),
5 years in (3), 10 years in (4) and 15 years in (5) after the education
reform passed.
3.4 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the importance of composition effects for education wage premiums
in Korea. Korea offers an interesting case because it has experienced a rise in educational
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attainment and education wage premiums, like most other advanced economies. However,
the rise in education was much larger and more rapid than that in most other advanced
economies. Further, some of the increase was policy-induced.
We use a simple empirical framework to introduce the main challenges confronted in the
literature. We then implement several procedures suggested in the literature to overcome
these challenges. We also show how to modify the existing approaches to exploit policy-
related variation in educational attainment.
Our findings are robust across the approaches and specifications. We find only modest
evidence for composition effects in the long run. By this, we mean that more-educated work-
ers are of higher average ability, but there is little change in the strength of this relationship
over time. However, we find strong evidence for a decrease in education wage premiums for
the cohorts most affected by the policy-induced expansion of education. This suggests to us
that composition effects do operate, but that they can be masked by offsetting forces when
studied over longer horizons. While Hendricks and Schoellman (2014) suggest some possible
forces that operated in the U.S., it is not clear that these forces generalize to Korea or other
advanced economies. This is an open question for future work.
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4.0 INPUT PRICE DISCRIMINATION, INFORMATIVE
ADVERTISEMENT EFFORTS, AND WELFARE1
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The literature on antitrust legislation and price protection policy has a long history ex-
tending from the amendment to the Robinson-Patman Act in the early 1930s, which orig-
inally aimed to protect small firms from potential predatory or anti-competitive behaviors
by large competitors in intermediate goods markets. But despite the original purpose of
the Robinson-Patman Act, as well as the extensive literature on price discrimination, price
discrimination with interdependent demand did not receive sufficient attention until Katz
(1987) recognized its significance in the intermediate goods market. Furthermore, although
many papers have studied the interdependency of the input demand since Katz (1987),2
due to their sole focus on the downstream firms’ decisions of strategic substitutes,3 they
have argued that third-degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolist that charges
more efficient downstream sellers higher prices hurts social welfare.4 In contrast, this paper
1This research is a joint work with Seung-Gyu Sim.
2DeGraba (1990) finds that allowing third-degree price discrimination dampens downstream firms’ in-
vestment in cost-saving technology, and Yoshida (2000) shows that an increase in aggregate output under
third-degree price discrimination is a sufficient condition for welfare deterioration in an intermediate goods
market, whereas it is a necessary condition for welfare improvement in a final goods market. Valletti (2003)
generalizes the results that Yoshida (2000) obtained.
3For the formal definition of strategic substitutes and complements, see Bulow et al. (1985). In our paper,
the advertisement effort by one seller increases the rival’s value of marginal product, and, hence, production.
It causes the complementarity between the advertisement efforts and quantity decisions, although it is
different from “strategic complementarity” by Bulow et al. (1985).
4Although some recent studies, such as Herweg and Mu¨ller (2012), Dertwinkel-Kalt et al. (2015b),
Dertwinkel-Kalt et al. (2015a), and Kim and Sim (2015), report the reversed welfare implication of allowing
third-degree price discrimination, those studies also rely on the same driving force that a more efficient seller
is charged more–because they presume downstream sellers’ decisions to be strategic substitutes.
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presents a reversal of the welfare implications in the previous literature by incorporating the
downstream sellers’ advertisement or commercialization efforts into the standard framework
by Katz (1987), DeGraba (1990), and Yoshida (2000).
Usually, downstream sellers purchase inputs from a supplier, produce the final products,
and advertise them. Unless the final products are sufficiently differentiated, the independent
advertisement decision by each seller causes the free-rider problem by its rivals. For example,
consider two sellers retailing the same products in different ways. One seller builds up an
online store, whereas the other seller manages an oﬄine store at a higher cost than the
former. Both sellers put their own advertisement efforts to attract potential customers. The
key assumption is that the commodity served by each seller is identical and delivers the same
level of utility to buyers. Potential customers observing one seller’s advertising may purchase
the commodity from the other seller. Without proper compensation for those advertising
efforts, both sellers may look for the opportunity to free-ride on the rival’s efforts.
This paper analyzes a monopolistic input market in which a monopolistic supplier pro-
vides two downstream sellers with inputs, and those sellers simultaneously choose their own
advertising efforts and, then, output levels. In a sharp contrast to DeGraba (1990), Yoshida
(2000), Dertwinkel-Kalt et al. (2015a), and Kim and Sim (2015), which argue that efficient
sellers are charged higher unit prices under third-degree price discrimination, this paper
demonstrates that when the advertisement cost is sufficiently inelastic to the advertisement
efforts, allowing third-degree price discrimination leads the supplier to offer one seller (cost-
efficient seller if they are asymmetric) a price discount5 and charge the other (inefficient
seller) a higher fee, which, in turn, induces the former (the latter) to do more (less) ad-
vertising. In fact, the supplier encourages the aggregate advertisement efforts and, hence,
production by clarifying the claim on the enhanced demand and penalizing free-riding be-
havior. Furthermore, the price discount given to the efficient seller in the asymmetric case
5Indeed, Intel, for the purpose of resolving the under-advertisement problem by computer manufacturers,
practiced a marketing strategy such that it had offered advertisement rebates to the computer manufacturers
that put “intel inside” in their own advertisements. The price discount in this paper can be understood as
a similar marketing rebate. However, Intel was charged by both the U.S. antitrust authorities and the
European Commission (EC) which claimed that Intel’s marketing rebate to PC producers was a predatory
strategy to maintain its market share against AMD and a price-discrimination strategy to favor relatively
larger manufacturers. Since we assume a monopolistic supplier, our aim is not to evaluate Intel’s marketing
strategy. For more detailed information, see Lee et al. (2013).
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improves allocation efficiency, as well. As a result, when the advertisement cost is sufficiently
inelastic, allowing third-degree price discrimination can improve social surplus, which is also
a reversal of the welfare implications in the previous literature.
The reversed welfare implication in the current paper is consistent with the findings by
Inderst and Valletti (2009), Inderst and Shaffer (2009) and Arya and Mittendorf (2010).
Inderst and Valletti (2009) show that when input prices are constrained by the threat of
demand-side substitution, a more efficient seller is charged a lower price. Also, Inderst and
Shaffer (2009) show that when the monopolistic supplier offers two-part tariff contracts, the
supplier offers a lower price to more efficient firms. The main emphasis of this paper is to
demonstrate that the upstream firm may want to treat otherwise identical downstream firms
differently. This is consistent with the previous contract theory papers such as Levitt (1995)
and Salant and Shaffer (1999) that even if agents are symmetric, asymmetric contracts can
be optimal for the principal.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the benchmark model and develop
a model with advertisement in which sellers are symmetric. Moreover, we set the stage
for simultaneous advertisement decisions between the supplier’s and sellers’ decision nodes.
Section 3 extends our scope to include the asymmetric case. Section 4 discusses the case in
which the advertisement efforts are controlled by the supplier and Section 5 concludes.
4.2 THE MODEL
4.2.1 The Benchmark Model without Advertisement
Consider a vertically related market structure in which one monopolistic supplier (hereafter
‘supplier’) provides two downstream final goods sellers (‘sellers’) with intermediate goods.
Each seller, denoted by i ∈ {1, 2}, purchases intermediate goods at unit price of ki ∈ R+,
assembles one unit of final goods at cost ci using one unit of intermediate goods, and sells
those final goods a` la Cournot competition. Throughout the paper, (c1, c2) are public in-
formation. The inverse demand for final goods is given by P (q1 + q2) = a − b(q1 + q2).
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While b is a positive constant in the benchmark model, it will be generalized in the next
subsection. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that c1 ≤ c2. The setting is equivalent
to the canonical framework by Katz (1987), DeGraba (1990), and Yoshida (2000). When a
is not large enough, we may get an equilibrium in which only one seller stays in the market.
Since it is not of our interest, we assumes that a is sufficiently large such that both sellers
produce in equilibrium.
Following Katz (1987), DeGraba (1990), and Yoshida (2000), we posit that the supplier
publicly posts (k1, k2) up front.
6 Seller i ∈ {1, 2}, taking both input price ki ∈ R+ and
rival’s choice q−i ∈ R+ as given, chooses its best response q˜i(ki; q−i) ∈ R+ to maximize
(a − b(q˜i(ki; q−i) + q−i) − ki − ci)q˜i(ki; q−i). The mutual best responses imply that, given
(k1, k2) ∈ R2+, seller i’s optimal decision, qi(ki; k−i) ∈ R+, should solve for
qi(ki; k−i) = q˜i(ki; q˜−i(k−i; qi(ki; k−i))). (4.1)
Then, the equilibrium markup of seller i ∈ {1, 2} is given by
mi(ki, k−i) =
1
3
[a− 2ci − 2ki + c−i + k−i], (4.2)
and the profit of seller i is given by mi(ki, k−i)qi(ki, k−i). When third-degree price discrimi-
nation is allowed, the supplier chooses (k1, k2) ∈ R2+ such that
max
k1, k2
k1q1(k1; k2) + k2q2(k2; k1) (4.3)
s.t. qi(ki; k−i) = qi(ki; q−i(k−i; qi(ki; k−i))) for each i ∈ {1, 2}.
When price discrimination is prohibited, the supplier solves for the same profit-maximizing
problem with one additional constraint, k1 = k2.
Lemma 1. When third-degree price discrimination is allowed,
(i) the supplier charges a higher unit price to the cost-efficient seller, and
(ii) social welfare deteriorates due to the allocation inefficiency.
In particular, if c1 = c2, the supplier charges the same price to both sellers and implements
the same symmetric equilibrium regardless of the pricing regime.
6By relaxing this assumption, McAfee and Schwartz (1994) and Rey and Verge´ (2004) study how firms’
beliefs react based on their rival’s contract.
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The underlying intuition of Lemma 1, which is a replication of Katz (1987), DeGraba
(1990), and Yoshida (2000), is that allowing third-degree price discrimination discourages
(encourages) production by the efficient (inefficient) seller because the supplier charges a
higher (lower) price to the efficient (inefficient) seller. Unless total output increases sig-
nificantly, social welfare deteriorates due to the allocation inefficiency.7 If the sellers are
symmetric, all those papers predict that allowing third-degree price discrimination has no
impact on the equilibrium outcome.
4.2.2 A Symmetric Model with Advertisement
In this subsection, we develop a simple model with advertisement in which sellers are sym-
metric, i.e., c1 = c2. Later, we extend our model to include the asymmetric case in Section
4.3.
The inverse demand curve adopted in the previous subsection is rationalized in the pres-
ence of a fixed number of homogeneous consumers having quasi-linear preferences over the
homogeneous final goods.8 Instead, this subsection endogenizes the number of consumers to
be determined by aggregate advertisement efforts. Suppose that a ‘representative’ consumer
consuming qˆ-units of the final goods has the following quasi-linear preferences:
u(qˆ) = aqˆ − b
2
qˆ2 − P qˆ, (4.4)
where P is the market price of the final goods as before; a is positive and sufficiently large;
and b is also positive.9 The individual demand for the final goods is obtained by qˆ = (a−P )/b.
Let ei be the advertisement effort of seller i ∈ {1, 2} and x(e1, e2) the number of consumers
who purchase the final goods from either seller10 after observing the advertisement. Then,
7This is the case because the discussion of ‘α-efficiency’ in Yoshida (2000) is dropped.
8This paper focuses on the effect of ‘demand enhancement’ by advertisement, assuming the homogeneous
goods. One can consider another potential effect of ‘business stealing,’ which makes the advertisement
decision to be strategic substitutes. Although the latter effect can be analyzed, together with the former, in a
price competition model with product differentiation, we confine our attention to the (qualitative) interaction
among the strategic complementary advertisement decisions by the sellers and input price discrimination by
the supplier, and leave the ‘business stealing issue’ for future (quantitative) research.
9Alternatively, we can assume quadratic preferences over two goods with the usual budget constraint.
The first goods is of our interest and the other goods can be the nume´raire.
10For the case with market segmentation, see Inderst and Shaffer (2009).
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the aggregate demand is given by Q = x(e1, e2)(a−P )/b, and the aggregate inverse demand
function by P = a−bQ/x(e1, e2) where it should be the case that Q = q1 +q2 in equilibrium.
For simplicity, let us assume that x(e1, e2) = e1 + e2. The advertisement effort entails the
convex cost structure, φ(ei) = e
η
i /η, where η > 1.
11 After observing (k1, k2), both sellers
make their own advertisement efforts simultaneously and then choose their outputs at the
same time.
In stage 3, seller i, taking (k1, k2, e1, e2) and the rival’s q−i ∈ R+ as given, chooses
qi(ei, e−i, ki, k−i; q−i) ∈ R+ such that
qi(ei, e−i, ki, k−i; q−i) ∈ argmax
qi
(a− (b/x(e1, e2))(qi + q−i)− ki − ci)qi − φ(ei), (4.5)
where c1 = c2 = c. The mutual best responses jointly define qi(ei, e−i, ki; k−i) ∈ R+ such that
for each i ∈ {1, 2}, qi(ei, e−i, ki; k−i) = q˜i(ei, e−i, ki, k−i; q˜−i(e−i, ei, k−i, ki; qi(ei, e−i, ki; k−i))).
In particular, the linear demand structure implies that
qi(ei, e−i, ki; k−i) = x(e1, e2)qi(ki; k−i), where qi(ki; k−i) solves for (4.1). (4.6)
Given (e1, e2, k1, k2), the sales profit for seller i ∈ {1, 2} is obtained by
mi(ki, k−i)x(e1, e2)qi(ki; k−i), (4.7)
where mi(ki, k−i) is given by (4.2).
In stage 2, each seller chooses the optimal advertisement effort ei(ki, k−i) ∈ R+ such that
ei(ki, k−i) ∈ argmax
ei
mi(ki, k−i)x(e1, e2)qi(ki; k−i)− φ(ei), (4.8)
which implies that
e1(k1, k2) + e2(k2, k1) =
(
1
b
) 1
η−1 (
m1(k1, k2)
2
η−1 +m2(k2, k1)
2
η−1
)
. (4.9)
Lemma 2 highlights the key role of advertisement in the model. In the benchmark
model, the sellers compete a` la Cournot, so that an increase in production by one seller
reduces his rival’s profit. Also, the technology investment by one seller in DeGraba (1990)
11The convexity requires that η should be greater than one.
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and Choi (1995), being strategic substitutes, reduces the other’s market share and, hence,
profit. However, seller i’s advertisement effort in our model increases his rival’s as well as
his own sales profit, unless the final goods are differentiated sufficiently. Without proper
compensation for those advertising efforts due to the equal access to the final goods market,
the opportunistic behavior of each seller results in under-advertisement, as in the tragedy of
the commons.12
Lemma 2. When a seller puts more effort into advertising, his and the other seller’s sales
profit increases.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Plugging (4.9) into (4.6) yields
x(e1, e2)qi(ki, k−i) =
(
1
b
) η
η−1 (
m1(k1, k2)
2
η−1 +m2(k2, k1)
2
η−1
)
mi(ki, k−i), (4.10)
where e1 = e1(k1, k2) and e2 = e2(k2, k1). Given (k1, k2), the monopolistic supplier’s profit is
obtained by
∑
i x(e1, e2)qi(ki; k−i)ki, where x(e1, e2)qi(ki; k−i) is presented in (4.10). Denote
by superscript D and U the outcome under the discriminatory and the uniform pricing rule,
respectively. When third-degree price discrimination is allowed, the supplier chooses (kD1 , k
D
2 )
such that
(kD1 , k
D
2 ) ∈ argmax
k1, k2
k1x(e1, e2)q1(k1; k2) + k2x(e1, e2)q2(k2; k1), (4.11)
subject to (4.10). Under the uniform pricing rule, the supplier solves for the same profit-
maximizing problem with one additional constraint, k1 = k2 = k
U .
Next, we show that allowing third-degree price discrimination leads the supplier to charge
different input prices for the symmetric sellers. Suppose to the contrary that (kU , kU) is an
optimal price. Let us define function f : R2+ → R+ such that
f(k1, k2) = k1x(e1, e2)q1(k1; k2) + k2x(e1, e2)q2(k2; k1). (4.12)
12The decentralized economy in which property rights or ownership –especially on the common or public
goods –are ill defined results in under-investment on those productive assets compared to the centralized
economy. The definitions of common goods and public goods are rivalrous but non-excludable and both
non-rivalrous and non-excludable, respectively.
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Then, the second order condition requires the corresponding Hessian matrix should be nega-
tive definite so that satisfy kD2f(k)k′ < 0, where k = (kU , kU). So, for (kU , kU) to be a local
maximizer, it must satisfy that f11(k
U , kU) < 0, f22(k
U , kU) < 0, and f11(k
U , kU)f22(k
U , kU)−
f12(k
U , kU)f21(k
U , kU) > 0, where fij denotes the second partial derivative of f with respect
to its ith argument, then with respect to it jth argument. It cannot be the case when η ≤ 2.
13 Panels (a), (b) and (c) in Figure 10 show the quantitative results based on different values
of η ∈ {1.5, 2.0, 2.5}. It reveals that when η ≤ 2, the symmetric solution of two first order
conditions is not a local maximum, but a saddle point as shown in panels (a) and (b) in
Figure 10. It can be a local maximum, in case that η > 2.
Lemma 3. When c1 = c2 = c,
(i) under the uniform pricing rule, kU = (a− c)(η − 1)/(2η), and
(ii) if η ≤ 2, kD1 = kD2 = kU . Otherwise, kD1 6= kD2 .
Proof. See C.
Lemma 3 tells us that it cannot be optimal to charge the same input prices to both
sellers, even when they are symmetric.14 It is an interesting reversal to the prediction in the
previous literature that the monopolistic supplier charges the same prices to those symmetric
sellers in the absence of advertisement. Intuitively, the free-riding incentives adversely affect
advertisement competition, if both sellers have equal access to the final goods market. In
order to avoid the under-advertisement problem, the supplier optimally differentiates the
input prices and stimulates one seller’s incentive to make an advertising effort. Without loss
of generality, we call ‘seller 1’ the seller who gets the price discount in the symmetric case.
Lemma 4. Suppose that c1 = c2 = c. Then, for cost elasticity of advertisement is small
enough, i.e., η ≤ 2, the following statements hold:
(i) eD1 > e
U
1 and x(e
D
1 , e
D
2 ) > x(e
U
1 , e
U
2 ).
13For more detailed proof, see the proof of Lemma 3 in C.
14Levitt (1995) shows that in contract theory, asymmetric contracts can be optimal for the principal even
if agents are symmetric. In order to analyze this, he set up the model in which the principal’s profit depends
on the maximum of two agents’ outputs. The analytical proof with a maximum function is presented in
Levitt (1995).
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Figure 10: Profit of monopolistic supplier
(a) η = 1.5
(b) η = 2.0
(c) η = 2.5
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(ii) Allowing third-degree price discrimination increases (decreases) the market share of seller
1 (seller 2).
(iii) If η is sufficiently close to one, qD1 > q
U
1 and q
D
1 + q
D
2 > q
U
1 + q
U
2 .
Proof. See C.
When we consider the case in which each agent is symmetric in terms of marginal cost,
the input price under the uniform pricing regime can be expressed as a convex combination
of the two input prices (kD1 , k
D
2 ) under the discriminatory pricing regime. Lemma 4 states
that even in the symmetric case, the supplier chooses (kD1 , k
D
2 ) as a means of transferring
the riding fee from the seller who devotes less effort to the efficient seller who devotes more
effort to clarify the latter’s claim on the enhanced demand. It also enlarges the aggregate
advertising efforts x(eD1 , e
D
2 ) by encouraging e
D
1 substantially. The price discount given to
seller 1 raises the market share of the seller under the discriminatory pricing rule. Apparently,
the increases in the aggregate advertisement efforts and the market share of seller 1 induce
that qD1 > q
U . But, the output of seller 2 behaves in an ambiguous way because his market
share declines. According to our numerical experiments with various parameter values, the
aggregate output is more likely to increase when third-degree price discrimination is allowed.
In those cases, we obtain the welfare implications such that the profit of seller 1 as well as
the supplier increases. However, since the consumer surplus relies on parameter values, we
postpone the analysis to the next section.
4.2.3 Numerical Analysis
We show by example that in the presence of advertisement, allowing third-degree price
discrimination raises the monopolistic supplier’s profit, consumer surplus, and total surplus
together, assuming c1 = c2 = 1. Let a = 10 and b = 1, which makes P = 10 − (q1 +
q2)/(e1 + e2). Given the demand structure, we analyze the equilibrium strategy and payoff
of each player, varying the cost elasticity of advertisement, η, from 1.5 to 3. In particular,
we remark that as η increases, all equilibrium outcomes are consistent with the prediction
in the previous literature.
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Figure 11: Equilibrium Prices and Advertisement Efforts between Symmetric Sellers
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This figure draws the loci of the equilibrium strategy by each player along the cost elasticity
of advertisement on the horizontal axis.
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Figure 11 presents the equilibrium prices, advertisement efforts and quantities under the
uniform and discriminatory pricing regimes. Panels (a), (c), and (e) show each equilibrium
outcome under the uniform pricing rule, whereas panels (b), (d), and (f) show each outcome
under the discriminatory pricing rule. Comparison between panels (a) and (b) uncovers
an interesting point: the input prices, regardless of the pricing rule, run together in the
same direction when cost of advertisement is more elastic, i.e., η increases, but the input
prices offered under the discriminatory pricing rule run in the opposite direction when η is
small enough.15 Panels (c)–(f) report that, as a result of the discriminatory treatment by
the supplier, the seller who gets the discounted offer puts more effort into advertisement
and takes a larger market share, whereas his rival puts less efforts and takes a smaller
market share. When the advertising cost becomes less elastic, allowing third-degree price
discrimination enables the monopolistic supplier to give one seller a dominant market share
in the downstream market. By offering different input prices to those symmetric sellers, the
supplier can effectively encourage not only the beneficiary’s advertisement effort, but also
the aggregate advertisement effort, especially when the advertising effort is less elastic. This,
in turns, increases the equilibrium output, as well.
Figure 12 summarizes the equilibrium payoffs of the supplier, sellers, and consumers
across different level of cost elasticity of advertisement. Panels (a) and (b) provide supporting
evidence for our discussion in the previous section. The supplier and seller 1 with the
discounted offer, benefit from switching to the discriminatory pricing regime. Also, panels
(c) and (d) show that especially when advertising cost is less elastic, consumer surplus and
total surplus dramatically increase due to the regime switch. In fact, under both pricing
regimes, as the advertising cost becomes less elastic, all economic agents except seller 2
get a higher surplus, on average, but they benefit more under discriminatory pricing. This
example tells us that, as in Coase (1960), by clarifying the claim on or accessibility to the
demand enhanced by advertisement, the supplier can increase both social surplus and her
own profit.
15Note that charging the same prices for both sellers is the local maximum for η ≥ 2. See Section 4.2.2.
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Figure 12: Equilibrium Payoffs and Surplus
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This figure draws the loci of the equilibrium strategy by each player along the cost elasticity
of advertisement on the horizontal axis.
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4.3 EXTENSION: ASYMMETRIC SELLERS
4.3.1 An Asymmetric Model with Advertisement
This subsection extends our scope to include the asymmetric case with c1 < c2. To obtain
analytical proofs in the asymmetric case, we add additional assumption that η = 2. Instead,
we extend the range of η through the numerical experiments in the next subsection and show
that the main arguments in this section still hold.
Assumption 1 η = 2.
From the first order conditions of the supplier’s problem with respect to k1 and k2 together
with Assumption 1, we derive the equilibrium pricing strategy as
−(4mD1 − 2mD2 )(kD1 mD1 + kD2 mD2 ) + ((mD1 )2 + (mD2 )2)(3mD1 − 2kD1 + kD2 ) = 0, (4.13)
and
−(4mD2 − 2mD1 )(kD1 mD1 + kD2 mD2 ) + ((mD1 )2 + (mD2 )2)(3mD2 − 2kD2 + kD1 ) = 0. (4.14)
Combining (4.13) and (4.14) yields
[a− 5c1 − 5kD1 + 4c2 + 4kD2 ][a− 2c2 − 4kD2 + c1 + 2kD1 ]
= [a− 5c2 − 5kD2 + 4c1 + 4kD1 ][a− 2c1 − 4kD1 + c2 + 2kD2 ]. (4.15)
Define a mapping gi : R+ → R+ such that
gi(ki) := αi − (3a− 9ci + 6c−i)ki + 6(ki)2, (4.16)
where αi = a
2 + 14cic−i + 2ac−i − 4aci − 5c2i − 8c2−i. Evaluating (4.16) at kD1 and kD2 yields
g1(k
D
1 ) := α1 − (3a− 9c1 + 6c2)kD1 + 6(kD1 )2
= α2 − (3a− 9c2 + 6c1)kD2 + 6(kD2 )2 := g2(kD2 ), (4.17)
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where the above equality immediately comes from (4.15). Note that if a > 1
2
(c1 + c2), then
α1 > α2, otherwise α1 < α2. Thus, when a >
1
2
(c1 + c2) and k1 = k2 = 0, g1(0) > g2(0).
Also,
g′1(k) = 12k − (3a− 9c1 + 6c2) < 12k − (3a− 9c2 + 6c1) = g′2(k). (4.18)
Let us denote the value of k at which g1(k) = g2(k) by k
∗. Note that at k1 = (a− 3c1 +
2c2)/4, g
′
1(k1) = 0. The presumption of k
D
1 ≥ kD2 , together with g1(k1) > g2(0), implies that
kD1 ≥ k∗ and kD2 ≥ k∗. For any y ≥ g1(k∗), define the inverse mapping of g1(·) and g2(·)
such that g−11 (y
∗) = k1 and g−12 (y
∗) = k2. Note that g−11 (y
∗)− g−12 (y∗) is strictly increasing
in y∗(≥ g1(k∗)). Then, we can solve for the pair of (k1, k2) at which g1(k1) = g2(k2) and
k1 − k2 = c2 − c1. Combining the two equations results in (k1, k2) = (a− c1, a− c2).
Figure 13 illustrates possible candidates of equilibrium input prices (kD1 , k
D
2 ) by sum-
marizing the above observations. Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 13 describes the case with
asymmetric sellers and symmetric sellers, respectively. In case of asymmetric sellers, there
are multiple candidates, depending on the value of g1(k1) = g2(k2), but Lemma 5 shows that
there is a unique pair of equilibrium input prices (kD1 , k
D
2 ) such that the supplier charges a
lower (higher) price to the efficient (inefficient) seller.
Lemma 5. Suppose that c1 < c2. Then, the monopolistic supplier charges a higher price to
the inefficient seller than the efficient seller–i.e., kD1 < k
D
2 .
Proof. See C.
Lemma 5 shows that the supplier offers a more favorable price to the efficient seller under
the discriminatory pricing rule. The supplier uses price-discrimination to alleviate the free-
riding problem associated with the advertisement decision. This result is similar to the main
argument of Inderst and Valletti (2009) and Inderst and Shaffer (2009) as well as the one
shown in Lemma 4. Intuitively, she chooses (kD1 , k
D
2 ) as a means of transferring the riding
fee from the inefficient seller to the efficient seller to clarify the ownership of the efficient
seller on the enhanced demand.
Lemma 6. Suppose that c1 < c2. Then, the following statements hold:
(i) eD1 > e
U
1 and x(e
D
1 , e
D
2 ) > x(e
U
1 , e
U
2 ).
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Figure 13: The Optimal Input Prices
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The horizontal axes of Panel (a) and (b) represent the input prices. In case of symmetric
sellers, when η ≤ 2, the solutions are on the saddle point. Hence, the solution in Panel
(b) does not hold. See Section 4.2.2.
(ii) Allowing third-degree price discrimination increases (decreases) the market share of the
cost-efficient seller (inefficient seller).
(iii) qD1 > q
U
1 .
Proof. See C.
The first statement in Lemma 6 states that the efficient seller puts in more effort and
the inefficient seller puts in less effort under the discriminatory pricing rule than under the
uniform pricing rule, which is analogous to the first statement in Lemma 4. As a result,
we obtain larger aggregate advertisement effort under the discriminatory pricing regime. As
shown in Lemma 4, the cost-efficient seller produces more and takes a larger market share
when third-degree price discrimination is allowed. But, the output of the inefficient seller is
somewhat ambiguous, although it slightly declines in our numerical experiments.
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Figure 14: Equilibrium Prices and Advertisement Efforts between Asymmetric Sellers
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This figure draws the loci of the equilibrium strategy by each player along the cost elasticity
of advertisement on the horizontal axis. At the intersection point in panel (b), (η ≈ 2.3)
kD1 = k
D
2 = k
U . In panel (d), the advertisement effort e1 almost overlaps the total effort.
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Figure 15: Equilibrium Payoffs and Surplus
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This figure draws the loci of the equilibrium strategy by each player along the cost elasticity
of advertisement on the horizontal axis.
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4.3.2 Numerical Analysis
Figure 14 presents the loci of each equilibrium strategy along the cost elasticity of adver-
tisement η when c1 = 1 and c2 = 2. In panel (a), when η ≈ 2.3, kD1 = kD2 . By construction,
kD1 = k
D
2 = k
U at the intersection point. When the advertising cost is less elastic than the
intersection point, k1 < k2 (k1 > k2). Moreover, as η decreases, the supplier charges less
overall, but she may charge the inefficient seller relatively more under the discriminatory
pricing rule. Panels (c) to (f) present the advertisement efforts and outputs under two dif-
ferent pricing regimes. All of these panels reveal patterns similar to those in the symmetric
case.
Figure 15 analyzes each player’s equilibrium payoffs across different level of cost elasticity
of advertisement. The results are the same with the symmetric case.
4.4 DISCUSSION: ADVERTISEMENT REBATE BY THE SUPPLIER
This section considers the case in which the supplier determines the effort level of advertise-
ment by each seller and provides each with an advertisement rebate. In order to maximize
her own profit, the supplier chooses (e˜1, e˜2, k˜1, k˜2) such that
(e˜1, e˜2, k˜1, k˜2) ∈ argmax
e1,e2,k1,k2
x(e1, e2)[k1q1(k1; k2) + k2q2(k2; k1)]− φ(e1)− φ(e2) (4.19)
s.t. qi(ki; k−i) = qi(ki; q−i(k−i; qi(ki; k−i))) for each i ∈ {1, 2}.
Lemma 7. When the monopolistic supplier can choose each seller’s advertisement efforts,
the supplier implements a higher level of aggregate advertisement efforts under the discrim-
inatory pricing regime than under the uniform pricing regime. Accordingly, the aggregate
output level is higher under the former. Moreover, the supplier charges k˜2 < k˜
U < k˜1.
Proof. See C.
Lemma 7 states that by choosing the optimal level of advertisement, the supplier can
force the sellers to put more effort into advertisement under discriminatory pricing than
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they would under the uniform pricing regime. Furthermore, when she can coordinate the
seller’s advertisement efforts, the supplier charges a higher price to the cost-efficient seller.
Interestingly, since the free-rider problem no longer matters, the supplier does not exploit
(k˜1, k˜2) as a means of charging a fee for potential free-riding. Instead, she charges a higher
price to the cost-efficient but inelastic seller, which shows that the optimal input prices in
both pricing regimes follow the same pattern in Katz (1987), DeGraba (1990), and Yoshida
(2000). However, unlike the previous literature, the aggregate output under discriminatory
pricing is higher than that under uniform pricing because of the effect of an increase in
advertisement effort.
In this case, the welfare implication is somewhat ambiguous. This is because, on the
one hand, allowing for third-degree price discrimination induces more advertisement efforts
by the supplier, and, on the other hand, more production by the inefficient seller, as in
the previous literature. Hence, total surplus may or may not be improved by permitting
third-degree price discrimination.
4.5 CONCLUSION
Unless the final products are sufficiently differentiated, the independent advertisement deci-
sions of final goods sellers may result in under-advertisement. Motivated by the free-rider
problem in the advertisement stage, this paper examines a vertically related market in which
a monopolistic supplier provides two downstream sellers with inputs, and those sellers si-
multaneously choose their own advertising or commercialization efforts, followed by their
own output levels. We find that when the demand for final goods is sufficiently elastic with
respect to sellers’ advertisement efforts, the monopolistic supplier charges a lower (higher)
price to the efficient (inefficient) seller in order to encourage advertisement under the dis-
criminatory pricing rule. As a result, total output, consumer surplus, and social surplus may
increase when third-degree price discrimination is permitted. This is a reversal of the welfare
implications of banning price discrimination suggested in previous studies, such as those of
Katz (1987), DeGraba (1990), and Yoshida (2000), which presume the sellers’ decisions to
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be strategic substitutes.
One potential shortcoming of the present research is that– our focus on the role of com-
plementarity between advertisement and production decision leads us to think of the supplier
as a coordinator to mitigate the free-rider problem– and, thus, to neglect potential product
differentiation by downstream sellers. When the final goods are differentiated, one seller’s
advertisement effort may enable him to promote the total number of customers in the mar-
ket and/or to attract his rival’s customers at the same time. We can analyze both effects
of ‘demand enhancement’ and ‘business stealing’ by developing an alternative model with
product differentiation. We leave it to future quantitative research to determine whether this
shortcoming has led us to oversimplify our argument and to overvalue the positive impact
of third-degree price discrimination.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 2
A.1 DATA
To measure the annual labor market transition rates, I define EE transition as job changes in
which employed workers leave for a job with a different employer and UE as the proportion
of workers who were unemployed in the previous year and are currently employed.
To classify job change, I use the empirical strategy in Stewart (2002). I restrict attention
to individuals who are employed during the time of the survey and satisfy at least one of the
following conditions: i) the individual had more than one employer in the previous year; ii)
the individual experienced more than one spell of unemployment (but, not more than two or
fewer weeks of unemployment); and iii) the individual experienced a change in the one-digit
industry code.1
1For more-detailed information on EE transition, see Stewart (2002).
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 3
B.1 SAMPLE FOR ANALYSIS 2: KAYMAK 2009
To estimate the effect of years of schooling on real wage following Kaymak (2009), we use
the yearly data from Korean Survey Report on Wage Structure between 1980 to 2011. The
sample is restricted to men between 25- and 60-years-old. Then the sample include cohorts,
who were born in the same year, born between 1920-1985.
Wages are measured by hour earnings that are calculated by dividing monthly wage and
salary earnings by monthly worked hours. Using CPI in 2010, we convert the wages to
real wages. The Korean Survey Report on Wage Structure provides 5 groups of education
attainments; Elementary, Middle and High schools, some college and four-years university.
We assign 6, 9, 12, 14 and 16 years to each group for years of schooling respectively. We drop
workers with less than half of the minimum wages in 2010, $4.11 and we also drop workers
who worked less than 35 hours per week.
B.2 SAMPLE FOR ANALYSIS 3: JUHN, KIM, AND VELLA 2005
To estimate relation between college wages premium and college share following Juhn et al.
(2005), we use the data from both Korean Survey Report on Wage Structure and Korea
Population Census. For information about the real wages, we use wage profile from the
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Korean Survey Report on Wage Structure from 1980 to 2010 every 5-year. Wages are mea-
sured by hour earnings that are calculated by dividing monthly wage and salary earnings by
monthly worked hours. Using CPI in 2010, we convert the wages to real wages. We drop
workers with less than half of the minimum wages in 2010, $4.11. and we also drop workers
who worked less than 35 hours per week. We get the numbers of college and non-college
graduates from the data from Korean population census. We also restrict the sample to
men between 27 and 65 years old and women between 23 and 65 years to consider people
who under a schooling. To get the numbers of college graduates and non-college graduates
for each cohort, we predict college share of each cohort at age 35 as a specified equation
provided by Juhn et al. (2005) using Korean population census data. We predicted every 5
years using the data from Korean population census 1966 and from 1970 to 2010.
B.3 APPENDIX FIGURE
Figure 16: Educational Attainment by Birth Cohort (Men)
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Note: Educational attainment measured in four mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. Attainment
measured using 33-37 year-olds in the 1966 or 1970–2010 Korean population censuses, which provides a
unique observation for each birth cohort.
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Figure 17: Educational Attainment by Birth Cohort (Women)
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Note: Educational attainment measured in four mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. Attainment
measured using 33-37 year-olds in the 1966 or 1970–2010 Korean population censuses, which provides a
unique observation for each birth cohort.
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APPENDIX C
CHAPTER 4
C.1 PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 2 The seller i’s profit is given by
pii =
[
a− b
(e1 + e2)
(q1(e1, e2, k1; k2) + q2(e2, e1, k2; k1))− ki − ci
]
×qi(ei, e−i, ki; k−i)− φ(ei), (C.1)
where qi(ei, e−i, ki; k−i) = (e1 + e2)mi(ki, k−i)/b. Taking derivative of (C.1) with respect to
his rival’s advertisement effort yields
∂pii
∂e−i
= [a− (m1(k1, k2) +m2(k2, k1))− ki − ci]mi(ki, k−i) > 0. (C.2)
Therefore, the advertisement efforts by one seller also increase the other’s profit. 
Proof of Lemma 3 Assume that c1 = c2 = c.
(i) Under the uniform pricing regime, the monopolistic supplier chooses kU such that
2m(kU , kU)
2
η−1
(
m(kU , kU)− η + 1
3(η − 1)k
U
)
= 0, (C.3)
where m(kU , kU) = (a− c− kU)/3.
This immediately implies the following optimal input price
kU =
(a− c)(η − 1)
2η
. (C.4)
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(ii) The first order optimality condition with respect to kD1 evaluated at k
U is
f1(k
U , kU) := 2
(
a− c− kU
3
) 2
η−1
[
a− c− 2kU
3
− 2k
U
3(η − 1)
]
= 0. (C.5)
The value inside the parenthesis is equal to zero, once we plug in the value for kU , so we get
f1(k
U , kU) = 0. In order to show kU is an optimal price, we should also check whether f(·)
is negative semidefinite at the optimal point. In other words, the second order condition
requires Hessian matrix must satisfy kD2f(k)k′ ≤ 0, where k = (kU , kU).
The second order condition with respect to kD1 evaluated at k
U is
f11(k
U , kU) =
1
η2 − 1
[
4
1
1−η+1 × 3 1+η1−η
(
(a− c)(1 + η)
η
) 2
η−1
]
(15− 5η − 2η2). (C.6)
The two roots are η = 0.25(−5 − √145) and η = 0.25(−5 + √145). So, if η > 1.76, then
f11(k
U , kU) < 0. This result shows that second order conditions evaluated at kU is not always
negative semidefinite.
In order to insure that (kU , kU) is a symmetric solution, the following condition must be
satisfied:
f11(k
U , kU)f22(k
U , kU)− f12(kU , kU)f21(kU , kU)
=
η
(η − 1)2(η + 1)3
3+η
1−η 16
2−η
1−η
((a− c)(η + 1)
η
) 4
η−1
(η2 + 3η − 10) > 0. (C.7)
Hence, η must be strictly greater than 2. 
Proof of Lemma 4 Assume that c1 = c2 = c.
(i) Note that m(k, k) = 1
3
(a − c − k). Since m(−∞,−∞) = ∞ and m(a − c, a − c) = 0,
m(k, k) monotonically declines with k ∈ (−∞, a−c]. By construction, (m(k, k)) 2η−1 is strictly
decreasing in k ∈ (−∞, a− c]. Define the threshold k ∈ R such that
(m(kD1 , k
D
2 ))
2
η−1 + (m(kD2 , k
D
1 ))
2
η−1 = (m(k, k))
2
η−1 + (m(k, k))
2
η−1 . (C.8)
Due to the convex property, we know that 2k < kD1 + k
D
2 .
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Conjecture 1 kU > k.
Suppose to the contrary that 0 < kU ≤ k. From the supplier’s optimal decision and
(C.8), we infer that
pis(k, k) ≤ pis(kD1 , kD2 ) =⇒ (m(k, k) +m(k, k))k ≤ mD1 kD1 +mD2 kD2 . (C.9)
Otherwise, pis(k, k) > pis(k
D
1 , k
D
2 ). Since k
U ≤ k, the first order condition (in stage 3)
evaluated at k = k implies that
− 2
η − 1(m(k, k)
2
η−1−1 +m(k, k)
2
η−1−1)(m(k, k) +m(k, k))k
+ ((m(k, k))
2
η−1 + (m(k, k))
2
η−1 )(3m(k, k) + 3m(k, k)− 2k) ≤ 0. (C.10)
Rewriting (C.10) yields
2(m(k, k)
2
η−1−1 +m(k, k)
2
η−1−1)
(η − 1)(3m(k, k) + 3m(k, k)− 2k) ≥
(m(k, k))
2
η−1 + (m(k, k))
2
η−1
km(k, k) + km(k, k)
≥ (m
D
1 )
2
η−1 + (mD2 )
2
η−1
mD1 k
D
1 +m
D
2 k
D
2
=
2((mD1 )
2
η−1−1 + (mD2 )
2
η−1−1)
(η − 1)(3mD1 + 3mD2 − kD1 − kD2 )
. (C.11)
The first inequality immediately follows from (C.10) and the second inequality from (C.8)
and (C.9). The last equality of (C.11) comes from the first order conditions of the supplier’s
profit maximization problem when third-degree price discrimination is allowed. However,
since 2k < kD1 + k
D
2 by construction,
2(m(k, k)
2
η−1−1 +m(k, k)
2
η−1−1)
(η − 1)(3m(k, k) + 3m(k, k)− 2k) =
4((2a− 2c− 2k)/3) 2η−1−1
(η − 1)(2a− 2c− 4k) (C.12)
<
4((2a− 2c− (kD1 + kD2 ))/3)
2
η−1−1
(η − 1)(2a− 2c− 2(kD1 + kD2 ))
<
2((mD1 )
2
η−1−1 + (mD2 )
2
η−1−1)
(η − 1)(3mD1 + 3mD2 − kD1 − kD2 )
,
which is a contradiction. The second inequality comes from condition 2k < kD1 + k
D
2 , and
the last inequality comes from convexity. Therefore, we conclude that kU > max{k, 0}.
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From the above argument, we know that m(kU , kU) < m(k, k). Then,
eU + eU = (ηb)
−1
η−1 [(m(kU , kU))
2
η−1 + (m(kU , kU))
2
η−1 ]
< (ηb)
−1
η−1 [(m(k, k))
2
η−1 + (m(k, k))
2
η−1 ] (C.13)
= (ηb)
−1
η−1 [(m(kD1 , k
D
2 ))
2
η−1 + (m(kD2 , k
D
1 ))
2
η−1 ] = eD1 + e
D
2
Moreover, since m(kU , kU) < m(k, k) < m(kD1 , k
D
2 ), it is obtained that e
U < eD1 .
(ii) The market share of seller 1 is given by
qD1
qD1 + q
D
2
=
m(kD1 , k
D
2 )
m(kD1 , k
D
2 ) +m(k
D
2 , k
D
1 )
and
qU
qU + qU
=
m(kU , kU)
m(kU , kU) +m(kU , kU)
. (C.14)
Since m(kD1 , k
D
2 ) > m(k
U , kU) and m(kD2 , k
D
1 ) < m(k
U , kU),
m(kD1 , k
D
2 )
m(kD1 , k
D
2 ) +m(k
D
2 , k
D
1 )
>
m(kU , kU)
m(kU , kU) +m(kD2 , k
D
1 )
>
m(kU , kU)
m(kU , kU) +m(kU , kU)
. (C.15)
Therefore, allowing third-degree price discrimination increases the market share of seller 1
and decreases that of seller 2.
(iii) Given (4.6), the ratio of seller 1’s quantity under the discriminatory pricing rule to it
under the uniform pricing rule is given by
qD1
qU1
=
(1 + (m(kD2 , k
D
1 )/m(k
D
1 , k
D
2 ))
2
η−1 )m(kD1 , k
D
2 )
((m(kU , kU)/m(kD1 , k
D
2 ))
2
η−1 + (m(kU , kU)/m(kD1 , k
D
2 ))
2
η−1 )m(kU , kU)
. (C.16)
Since m(kD1 , k
D
2 ) > m(k
D
2 , k
D
1 ) and m(k
D
1 , k
D
2 ) > m(k
U , kU),
lim
η→1
(m(kD2 , kD1 )
m(kD1 , k
D
2 )
) 2
η−1
= 0 and lim
η→1
(m(kU , kU)
m(kD1 , k
D
2 )
) 2
η−1
= 0. (C.17)
Then, as η goes to one, the quantity ratio (C.42) will be
lim
η→1
qD1
qU1
> 0. (C.18)
This implies that when η is sufficiently close to one, qD1 > q
U
1 .
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Similarly, the ratio of total quantities between two different regimes is given by
qD1 + q
D
2
qU1 + q
U
2
=
(1 + (m(kD2 , k
D
1 )/m(k
D
1 , k
D
2 ))
2
η−1 )(m(kD1 , k
D
2 ) +m(k
D
2 , k
D
1 ))
2(m(kU , kU)/m(kD1 , k
D
2 ))
2
η−1 )
2
η−1 2m(kU , kU)
. (C.19)
So, as η goes to one, the total quantities ratio (C.42) will be
lim
η→1
qD1 + q
D
2
qU1 + q
U
2
> 0. (C.20)
This implies that when η is sufficiently close to one, (qD1 + q
D
2 ) > (q
U
1 + q
U
2 ). 
Proof of Lemma 5 Suppose to the contrary that kD1 ≥ kD2 . The first-order conditions of
the supplier’s constrained profit maximization problem imply that
−(4mD1 − 2mD2 )(kD1 mD1 + kD2 mD2 ) + ((mD1 )2 + (mD2 )2)(3mD1 − 2kD1 + kD2 ) = 0, (C.21)
and
−(4mD2 − 2mD1 )(kD1 mD1 + kD2 mD2 ) + ((mD1 )2 + (mD2 )2)(3mD2 − 2kD2 + kD1 ) = 0. (C.22)
Combining (4.13) and (4.14) yields
[a− 5c1 − 5kD1 + 4c2 + 4kD2 ][a− 2c2 − 4kD2 + c1 + 2kD1 ]
= [a− 5c2 − 5kD2 + 4c1 + 4kD1 ][a− 2c1 − 4kD1 + c2 + 2kD2 ]. (C.23)
Let us define the following quadratic function
gi(ki) := αi − (3a− 9ci + 6c−i)ki + 6(ki)2, (C.24)
where αi = a
2 + 14cic−i + 2ac−i − 4aci − 5c2i − 8c2−i. Evaluating (C.24) at kD1 and kD2 yields
g1(k
D
1 ) := α1 − (3a− 9c1 + 6c2)kD1 + 6(kD1 )2
= α2 − (3a− 9c2 + 6c1)kD2 + 6(kD2 )2 := g2(kD2 ), (C.25)
where the above equality immediately comes from (C.23). Note that if a > 1
2
(c1 + c2), then
α1 > α2, otherwise α1 < α2. Thus, when a >
1
2
(c1 + c2) and k1 = k2 = 0, g1(0) > g2(0).
Also,
g′1(k) = 12k − (3a− 9c1 + 6c2) < 12k − (3a− 9c2 + 6c1) = g′2(k). (C.26)
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Let us denote the value of k at which g1(k) = g2(k) by k
∗. Note that at k1 =
(a − 3c1 + 2c2)/4, g′1(k1) = 0. The presumption of kD1 ≥ kD2 , together with g1(k1) > g2(0),
implies that kD1 ≥ k∗ and kD2 ≥ k∗. For any y ≥ g1(k∗), define the inverse mapping of g1(·)
and g2(·) such that g−11 (y∗) = k1 and g−12 (y∗) = k2. Note that g−11 (y∗)−g−12 (y∗) is strictly in-
creasing in y∗(≥ g1(k∗)). Then, we can solve for the pair of (k1, k2) at which g1(k1) = g2(k2)
and k1 − k2 = c2 − c1. Combining the two equations results in (k1, k2) = (a− c1, a− c2).
Combining (C.21) and (C.22) yields
(2mD1 −mD2 )(3mD2 − 2kD2 + kD1 ) = (2mD2 −mD1 )(3mD1 − 2kD1 + kD2 )
=⇒ 6mD1 mD2 − 3(mD2 )2 − 4mD1 kD2 + 2mD2 kD2 + 2mD1 kD1 −mD2 kD1
= 6mD2 m
D
1 − 3(mD1 )2 − 4mD2 kD1 + 2mD1 kD1 + 2mD2 kD2 −mD1 kD2
=⇒ −3(mD2 )2 − 4mD1 kD2 −mD2 kD1 = −3(mD1 )2 − 4mD2 kD1 −mD1 kD2
=⇒ 3(mD2 )2 − 3mD2 kD1 = 3(mD1 )2 − 3mD1 kD2
=⇒ mD2 (mD2 − kD1 ) = mD1 (mD1 − kD2 ) (C.27)
Case 1: Suppose (mD1 −kD2 ) > 0 and (mD2 −kD1 ) > 0. Then, mD1 < mD2 , otherwise mD2 (mD2 −
kD1 ) < m
D
1 (m
D
1 −kD2 ). This implies mD1 −mD2 = (c2−c1)−(kD1 −kD2 ) < 0. Since k1−k2 = c2−c1
at y∗ by construction, kD1 − kD2 > c2 − c1 for any y > y∗. However, in this case,
(mD2 − kD1 ) =
1
3
(a− 2c2 + c1 − 2(kD2 + kD1 ))
<
1
3
(a− 2c2 + c1 − 2(2a− c1 − c2)) < 0. (C.28)
This is a contradiction.
Case 2: Suppose that (mD1 − kD2 ) < 0 and (mD2 − kD1 ) < 0. Since
|mD2 − kD1 | = |
1
3
(a− 2c2 + c1 − 2kD1 − 2kD2 )|
> |1
3
(a− 2c1 + c2 − 2kD1 − 2kD2 )| = |mD1 − kD2 |, (C.29)
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mD1 > m
D
2 , otherwise the equality in (C.27) cannot be satisfied. This implies m
D
1 −mD2 =
(c2 − c1)− (kD1 − kD2 ) > 0. Hence, (c2 − c1) > (kD1 − kD2 ). In this case,
mD2 (m
D
2 − kD1 ) = mD1 (mD1 − kD2 ) (C.30)
mD2
mD1
=
(mD1 − kD2 )
(mD2 − kD1 )
(C.31)
a− 2c2 + c1 − 2kD2 + kD1
a− 2c1 + c2 − 2kD1 + kD2
=
a− 2c1 + c2 − 2(kD1 + kD2 )
a− 2c2 + c1 − 2(kD1 + kD2 )
. (C.32)
Note that the left hand side of (C.32) is
a− 2c2 + c1 − 2kD2 + kD1
a− 2c1 + c2 − 2kD1 + kD2
=
a− 2c2 + c1 − 2kD2 + kD1
a− 2c2 + c1 − 2kD2 + kD1 + 3(c2 − c1)− 3(kD1 − kD2 )
< 1. (C.33)
But, the right hand side of (C.32) is
a− 2c1 + c2 − 2(kD1 + kD2 )
a− 2c2 + c1 − 2(kD1 + kD2 )
=
a− 2c1 + c2 − 2(kD1 + kD2 )
a− 2c1 + c2 − 2(kD1 + kD2 )− 3(c2 − c1)
> 1. (C.34)
This is a contradiction. Therefore, we conclude that kD1 < k
D
2 . 
Proof of Lemma 6
(i) Note that mi(−∞,−∞) =∞, mi(a−2ci+ c−i, a−2ci+ c−i) = 0, and mi(k, k) monotoni-
cally declines with k ∈ (−∞, a−2ci+c−i]. By construction, (mi(k, k))2 is strictly decreasing
in k ∈ (−∞, a− 2ci + c−i]. Define k such that
(mD1 )
2 + (mD2 )
2 = (m1(k, k))
2 + (m2(k, k))
2. (C.35)
If k ≤ 0, then (mD1 )2 + (mD2 )2 ≥ (m1(0, 0))2 + (m2(0, 0))2 > (mU1 )2 + (mU2 )2. If kU > k > 0,
then (mD1 )
2 +(mD2 )
2 = (m1(k, k))
2 +(m2(k, k))
2 > (mU1 )
2 +(mU2 )
2 because mi(k, k) > m
U
i for
each i ∈ {1, 2}. Both cases imply that eD1 + eD2 > eU1 + eU2 . Finally, suppose to the contrary
that k ≥ kU > 0. From the supplier’s optimal decision, we infer that
pis(k, k) ≤ piDs =⇒ (m1(k, k) +m2(k, k))k ≤ mD1 kD1 +mD2 kD2 . (C.36)
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When kU ≤ k, the first order condition at kU = k implies that
−2(m1(k, k) +m2(k, k))(m1(k, k) +m2(k, k))k
+ ((m1(k, k))
2 + (m2(k, k))
2)(3m1(k, k) + 3m2(k, k)− 2k) ≤ 0. (C.37)
Rewriting (C.37) yields
2(m1(k, k) +m2(k, k))
3m1(k, k) + 3m2(k, k)− 2k
≥ (m1(k, k))
2 + (m2(k, k))
2
km1(k, k) + km1(k, k)
(C.38)
≥ (m
D
1 )
2 + (mD2 )
2
mD1 k
D
1 +m
D
2 k
D
2
=
2(mD1 +m
D
2 )
3mD1 + 3m
D
2 − kD1 − kD2
.
The second inequality comes from (C.35) and (C.36). The last equality of (C.38) comes
from the first order conditions of the supplier’s profit maximization problem. However, since
2k < kD1 + k
D
2 by construction,
2(m1(k, k) +m2(k, k))
3m1(k, k) + 3m2(k, k)− 2k
=
2a− c1 − c2 − 2k
3(2a− c1 − c2 − 4k)
(C.39)
<
2a− c1 − c2 − (kD1 + kD2 )
3(2a− c1 − c2 − 2(kD1 + kD2 ))
=
2(mD1 +m
D
2 )
3mD1 + 3m
D
2 − kD1 − kD2
,
which is a contradiction. The second strict inequality comes from condition 2k < kD1 + k
D
2 .
Therefore, we conclude that kU > max{k, 0}, (mD1 )2 + (mD2 )2 > (mU1 )2 + (mU2 )2, and
eD1 +e
D
2 > e
U
1 +e
U
2 . Lemma 5, together with the above argument, says that m
D
2 < m2(k, k) <
m1(k, k) < m
D
1 because (m1(k, k)−m2(k, k)) < (mD1 −mD2 ). Since kU > k, we obtain that
mU1 < m1(k, k) < m
D
1 and e
U
1 < e
D
1 .
(ii) The market share of seller 1 is given by
qD1
qD1 + q
D
2
=
m1(k
D
1 , k
D
2 )
m1(kD1 , k
D
2 ) +m2(k
D
2 , k
D
1 )
and
qU1
qU1 + q
U
2
=
m1(k
U , kU)
m1(kU , kU) +m2(kU , kU)
. (C.40)
Since m1(k
D
1 , k
D
2 ) > m1(k
U , kU) and m2(k
D
2 , k
D
1 ) < m2(k
U , kU),
m1(k
D
1 , k
D
2 )
m1(kD1 , k
D
2 ) +m2(k
D
2 , k
D
1 )
>
m1(k
U , kU)
m1(kU , kU) +m2(kD2 , k
D
1 )
>
m1(k
U , kU)
m1(kU , kU) +m2(kU , kU)
.
(C.41)
83
Therefore, allowing third-degree price discrimination increases the market share of the cost-
efficient seller and decreases that of the inefficient seller.
(iii) The ratio of seller 1’s quantity under the discriminatory pricing rule to it under the
uniform pricing rule is given by
qD1
qU1
=
(1 + (m2(k
D
2 , k
D
1 )/m1(k
D
1 , k
D
2 ))
2)m1(k
D
1 , k
D
2 )
((m1(kU , kU)/m1(kD1 , k
D
2 ))
2 + (m1(kU , kU)/m1(kD1 , k
D
2 ))
2)m1(kU , kU)
> 1, (C.42)
since m1(k
D
1 , k
D
2 ) > m2(k
D
2 , k
D
1 ) and m1(k
D
1 , k
D
2 ) > m1(k
U , kU). This implies that when η is
sufficiently close to one, qD1 > q
U
1 . 
Proof of Lemma 7 Consider that the supplier chooses (e˜D1 , e˜
D
2 , k˜
D
1 , k˜
D
2 ) such that
max
e1,e2,k1,k2
k1
(e1 + e2)
b
m1(k1, k2) + k2
(e1 + e2)
b
m2(k2, k1)− 1
η
eη1 −
1
η
eη2. (C.43)
The first-order conditions are given by
e1 :
1
b
(k˜D1 m1(k˜
D
1 , k˜
D
2 ) + k˜
D
2 m2(k˜
D
2 , k˜
D
1 ))− (e˜D1 )η−1 = 0, (C.44)
e2 :
1
b
(k˜D1 m1(k˜
D
1 , k˜
D
2 ) + k˜
D
2 m2(k˜
D
2 , k˜
D
1 ))− (e˜D2 )η−1 = 0, (C.45)
k1 :
(e˜D1 + e˜
D
2 )
b
(
m1(k˜
D
1 , k˜
D
2 )−
2
3
k˜D1 +
1
3
k˜D2
)
= 0, and (C.46)
k2 :
(e˜D1 + e˜
D
2 )
b
(
m2(k˜
D
2 , k˜
D
1 )−
2
3
k˜D2 +
1
3
k˜D1
)
= 0. (C.47)
Combining (C.44)-(C.47) yields
e˜D1 = e˜
D
2 =
[2
b
(
m21(k˜
D
1 , k˜
D
2 ) +m1(k˜
D
1 , k˜
D
2 )m2(k˜
D
2 , k˜
D
1 ) +m
2
2(k˜
D
2 , k˜
D
1 )
)] 1η−1
. (C.48)
From (C.46) and (C.47), we get the following optimal input prices
k˜D1 =
(a− c1)
2
, and k˜D2 =
(a− c2)
2
. (C.49)
Since c1 < c2, we get k˜
D
1 > k˜
D
2 . Consider the uniform pricing rule in which the supplier solves
for the same profit-maximizing problem (C.43) with one additional constraint, k1 = k2 = k
U .
In this case, the optimal level of advertisement and input price are given by
e˜U1 = e˜
U
2 =
[ 3
2b
(
m1(k˜
U , k˜U) +m2(k˜
U , k˜U)
)2] 1η−1
, and k˜U =
2a− c1 − c2
4
. (C.50)
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By comparing k˜U with (k˜D1 , k˜
D
2 ), we get k˜
D
2 < k˜
U < k˜D1 . Given {k˜D2 , k˜D1 , k˜U}, it is clear that
e˜D1 = e˜
D
2 > e˜
U
1 = e˜
U
2 .
Recall that the aggregate output is given by
q˜D1 + q˜
D
2 =
2e˜D1
b
(m1(k˜
D
1 , k˜
D
2 ) +m2(k˜
D
2 , k˜
D
1 )). (C.51)
Since m1(k˜
D
1 , k˜
D
2 )+m2(k˜
D
2 , k˜
D
1 ) = m1(k˜
U , k˜U)+m2(k˜
U , k˜U) and e˜D1 + e˜
D
2 > e˜
U
1 + e˜
U
2 , we obtain
that q˜D1 + q˜
D
2 > q˜
U
1 + q˜
U
2 . 
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